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NOTES
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF BIRTH CONTROL UNDER
OBSCENITY LAWS*
REGULATION of contraceptives in America began in 1873 with Congressional
enactment of a bill "for the suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of,
obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use."' By forbidding the mail-
ing,2 importation,3 and interstate transportation 4 of indecent articles and
obscene publications and "contraceptives," Congress hoped to check the moral
degeneration that followed the Civil War.5 As the title and classification of
the Act would indicate, its purpose was to suppress the traffic in pornographic
materials.6 The cursory debate in Congress discloses that this was the evil
sought to be cured 7 and that contraceptives were included to the extent that
they might be subjected to immoral use. Since discussion of birth control
was then socially taboo and profound ignorance enveloped the whole subject
of contraceptives,8 it is not surprising that they were treated as a sidelight
of the obscenity issue. From the initial success in Congress" the crusade
* Commonwealth 
€-. Corbett, 29 N. E. (2d) 151 (Mass. 1940).
1. S. 1572, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. (1873).
2. REV. STAT. § 3893 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 334 (1934).
3. 29 STAT. 512 (1897), 18 U. S. C. § 396 (1934) (imposes personal liability on
importer) ; 38 STAT. 194 (1913), 19 U. S. C. § 1305 (a) (1934) (provides for libel pro-
ceedings against illegal articles themselves).
4. 29 STAT. 512 (1897), 18 U. S. C. §396 (1934).
5. Scandals in government, business, and society attest the low ethical standards of
post-war leadership. See 2 ADAMTS, THE MARCH OF Dxmocmcv (1933) 137 et seq.;
JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934) 121, 149, 192, 216.
6. See 18 U. S. C. § 334 (1934) ("mailing obscene matter"); idem. § 396 ("im-
porting or transporting obscene books") ; idein. § 1305 (a) ("immoral articles, importa-
tion prohibited"). See also N. Y. PEN. LAW Art. 106 ("Indecency").
7. Senator Conkling's remark that he could not aver anything certain in regard to
the bill, if he were asked what it contained, reveals the imperfect Congressional under-
standing of the ramifications of the Comstock Act. Congress was anxious to reduce the
amount of obscene literature and indecent articles then in circulation, however, and the
bill was passed because of its connection with that general problem. Discussion in the
Senate was a matter of minutes. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. (1873) 1436-7,
1524-5, 1571. Consideration in the House of Representatives was even more abbreviated.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. (1873) 2004, App. 168-9.
8. ZINSsER, As I REMEMBER HIm (1940) 136, 163.
9. Credit for the federal anti-vice statute belongs to a single individual, Anthony
Comstock, who devoted his life to a crusade against immorality. In his dual capacity as
leader of the Society for the Suppression of Vice and Special Agent for the U. S. Post
Office, Comstock, by his own count, arrested and convicted "persons enough to fill a
passenger train of sixty-one coaches" and "destroyed 160 tons of obscene literature."
Incarcerating disreputable printers, raiding art galleries and suppressing Shaw's new
plays, the crusader battled for his Puritanic standards despite a thankless public which
spurned the Y. M. C. A. and dubbed his activities "comstockery." The semi-official
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against immorality gathered sufficient momentum to influence state legisla-
tures to pass obscenity laws.10 Although no specific mention of contraceptives
was made in some of these laws," in others, as in the federal statutes, they
were classified specifically among the indecent articles and obscene publica-
tions which were prohibited.' 2
These original so-called Comstock Acts made no explicit exception per-
mitting physicians to prescribe contraceptives in their medical practice. 3
Numerous attempts were made to clarify the position of doctors under such
indefinite statutes,' 4 but only a few were successful. The legislative failure
to determine the scope of the obscenity laws stems primarily from the religious
opposition of the Roman Catholic Church.' 0 This organization, though ad-
biography is TRU.XmULL, ANITHONY CO STOcK-FIGHTER (1913). For a more penetrat-
ing account see BRoUN AND LFEECH, ANTHONY CoMsTocK (1927).
10. Typical provisions of these statutes would forbid possession, sale, or manufacture
of obscene and indecent articles and literature. For a complete collection, see Legis.
(1932) 45 HARv. L. Ray. 723. The Pennsylvania law there mentioned has since been
repealed. June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, § 1201. It has, however, been replaced by a new and
very ambiguous act. PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 18, §4525. Some states
have recently established statutory standards to which contraceptives must conform. Onz.
CoDE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §68-2066-2068; Wis. STAT. (1933) §351235; Idaho Laws
1937, c. 72; Ky. STAT. AN.N. (Carroll, 1939 Supp.) § 2635c. For a discussion of the con-
stitutionality of the Kentucky statute, see (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 206.
11. In twenty-one states no such reference is made. Legis. (1932) 45 HAm'. L REV.
723. For a case in which such a statute has been interpreted to include contraceptives,
see Lanteen Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark, 294 I1. App. 81, 13 N. & (2d) 678 (1938)
(equitable relief denied to a manufacturer of such articles on the basis of the "unclean
hands" doctrine).
12. Seven states attempt to suppress the circulation of contraceptives by expressly
outlawing their sale, advertising and/or manufacture. Connecticut has gone so far as to
prohibit the use; others merely regulate the manner of distribution. CoN.-.. Gas. STr.
(1930) §§ 6246, 6562. A Detroit ordinance confining sale or distribution of contra-
ceptives to druggists and physicians, and forbidding display or advertising thereof, was
upheld in People v. Pennock, 294 Mich. 578, 293 N. W. 759 (1940).
- 13. As originally presented to Congress, Comstock's bill contained such an excep-
tion, but it was deleted prior to enactment. The statement by Senator Buckingham, the
bill's sponsor, that this deletion made no material alteration is understandable in view of
the imperfect state of both the public and medical knowledge of the subject. CozG. GLoE,
42d Cong., 3d Sess. (1873) 1524. See note 8 sdpra.
14. For a thorough discussion of early attempts to amend the federal laws, see D=-
N-rr, BiRTH CONTROL LAWS (1926). Subsequent bills were S. 4582, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. (1931); H. R. 11082, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), H. R 5978, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934). Although bills were presented to the Connecticut legislature in every odd year
from 1923 through 1935, only three came to the floor. The House voted 226 to 18 against
the 1929 bill and defeated the 1931 bill by a vote of 172 to 76. The 1933 bill was
passed by the House, 169 to 80, but was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 18 to 15.
15. See, e.g., N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1145.
16. In the Congressional hearings, testimony against bills to amend the birth con-
trol laws has come almost exclusively from Catholic groups. See Hearings before Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5978, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 126 el seq., Hearings
before Subcommittee of Committee on the Judiciary on S. 4436, 72d Cong., Ist Sess.
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mitting the necessity for birth control for economic as well as health reasons,
objects to the employment of mechanical devices on the ground that their
use is sinful.1 7 It has, however, officially endorsed the natural or "rhythm"
method as the only virtuous means of birth control.' 8 As long as this view
prevails, pressure of large Catholic blocs on state legislatures will render the
presentation of amendatory legislation futile.19 Consequently statutes orig-
inally designed to stamp out obscenity will continue to assist a minority
group in suppressing conduct which it alone considers sinful.
Despite the all-inclusive terms in which contraceptives are outlawed in
the federal statutes, federal courts have, without exception, held that they
should not apply to use in medical practice. In the leading case of United
States v. One Package the District Court's judgment 20 dismissing a libel
proceeding against certain contraceptive materials was affirmed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.21 The court stressed the prevailing ignorance about
birth control at the time the statute was enacted and felt that application of
the statute to physicians who sought to save life and promote health was
inconsistent with Congress' intention to suppress obscenity. The same Court
had previously extended trade-mark protection to a manufacturer of contra-
ceptives since his product was susceptible of legal use under medical direc-
tion.2 2 In that case Judge Swan said that prohibition of proper medical use
"is not lightly to be ascribed to Congress."2 3 Although his statement was
(1932) 114 et seq. Both Protestant Episcopal and Methodist Episcopal Churches, on the
other hand, have approved the birth control movement. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1934,
p. 12, col. 3, May 22, 1938, sec. 1, p. 20, col. 1.
17. Father Francis J. Connell, Birth Control: The Case for the Catholic, 164 AT-
LANTIc MONTHLY 468, 471 (1939). "Reasons of health or economy not infrequently make
it advisable for a couple not to have more children. But the only lawful method of avoid-
ing parenthood is abstinence, either total or periodic . . . Married persons who are
anxious to have more children but find an increase of their family impossible because of
economic stress are particularly deserving of sympathy." Almost 30% of the patients of
birth control clinics who report their religion are Catholics. BROMLEY, BInTH CONTROL
(1934) 142.
18. PoPE Plus XI, ENCYCLICAL ON CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE (1930). See Hucans,
POPE PIus THE ELEVENTH (1937) 265. For notorious unreliability of this method, see In
Matter of Scientific Instruments, Inc., F. T. C. File No. 1-10400 (1940).
19. On December 4, 1940, an initiative petition to permit doctors to prescribe con-
traceptives was filed in Massachusetts. Bost. Eve. Transcript, Dec. 4, 1940, p. 8, col. 7.
Petitions of this sort represent one possibility for avoiding a legislative stalemate. The
attitude of the Catholic Church, moreover, is unyielding. "The Catholic Church can never
change its stand on this matter. If the human race is in existence ten thousand years
hence, no matter what changes have taken place in the social, economic and scientific
spheres, the Catholic Church will still be preaching the same doctrine on birth control
that it is teaching today." Connell, supra note 17, at 473.
20. 13 F. Supp. 334 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
21. 86 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
22. Youngs Rubber Co., Inc. v. C. I. Lee & Co., Inc., 45 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 2d,
1930).
23. Id. at 108.
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dictum, it was followed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals "not as prece-
dent, but because the soundness of its reasoning commends itself to us." 2 4
By permitting medical use of contraceptives, the federal courts have removed
the impediment to vast improvements in public health standards threatened
by archaic national legislation. Both maternal and infant welfare may demand
intelligent child spacing and postponement of pregnancies until women are
physically fit to undertake them. - 5 The appalling annual losses of life and
health among women who resort to abortion should be reduced.2 6 That birth
control is an efficacious method for achieving these benefits is attested by the
records of the charitable clinics2 7 as well as the conspicuous success of state-
sponsored clinics in North and South Carolina28 and abroad.2
In addition to the support supplied by desirable social consequences, the
statutory construction employed by the federal courts finds justification in
sound judicial analogy. 30 Realizing that legislatures cannot anticipate all
future contingencies, courts have frequently had occasion to apply statutes
to unforeseen situations. 3' Nor should failure of the legislature to adopt clari-
fying amendments influence the courts; although legislative refusal to change
a law is frequently a valid indication of approval of the policy embodied in
it, failure to adopt a later clarifying amendment does not mean that the
legislature enacting the statute intended a policy contrary to that embodied
24. Davis v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 473, 475 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
25. Maternal and infant deaths vary directly with the number of children per mother
and vary inversely with the length of time since the last preceding birth. CAUSAL. FAc-
TORS IN INFANT MORTALITY (U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, No. 142, 1940).
Many common ailments such as tuberculosis, cardiac disease, cancer, diabetes and vene-
real disease are medical indications that pregnancy would endanger the woman's life.
See HOLDEN, CHILD SPACING (1939) ; SropEs, CoxTRAcEmPXox (1934) 46.
26. Between 600,000 and 1,000,000 abortion operations are performed annually in the
United States. Since they are performed in secrecy, statistics are approximate. Abortions
bring death to at least twenty-two American women every day and cause serious injury
to countless others. Ninety per cent of such operations are performed on married women.
See BRoi:LEY, op. cit. supra note 17, c. XI.
27. There are almost six hundred such clinics in the United States today. Treat-
ment is generally restricted to married women with medical indications that health would
be impaired by pregnancy. See note 25 supra. Only patients who cannot afford private
medical attention are accepted. Of the 46,582 new patients who visited the clinics last
year, 34% had husbands who were unemployed and on relief.
28. The spectacular increase in maternal health as well as in the number of healthy,
living children born in North Carolina is described in Wharton, Birth Control: The Case
for the State, 164 ATANTIC MOzhiTLY (1939) 463. See also publications of Birth Can-
tr6l Federation of America.
29. Although birth control clinics have existed for many years in the more pro-
gressive countries of Europe, Sweden has shown the greatest aptitude at using them to
control population, and to achieve better housing and other social objectives. See Childs,
Sweden Revisited, 27 YALE RLEViW 30 (1937).
30. Directly in point is the decision in Bours v. United States, 229 Fed. 960 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1915), in which the section of the Comstock Act prohibiting use of the mails to
arrange for "any abortion" was held not to apply to a case where a woman's life was in
danger.
31. CA, ozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs (1921) 17, 69.
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in the amendment.32 This is especially true of birth control laws, which were
passed through the efforts of one pressure group33 and maintained by those
of another,34 although opposed by the vast majority of the public.35
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Corbett30 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court adopted the attitude toward statutory construction
which had been taken by the federal courts. The case involved the indictment
of a pharmacist for selling prophylactics to a policeman. The conviction
below was reversed on appeal despite the all-inclusive statutory provision
against such sales,3 7 the court relying on other statutes which showed a
well-defined Commonwealth policy to prevent the spread of venereal disease.08
Since the articles in question might have been used for that purpose as well
as to prevent conception,3 9 the court held that, when articles susceptible
of a dual use had been sold, the state must show illegal intent in order to
sustain a conviction.40 Other types of contraceptives by their nature are not
within the exception made by this decision.
This judicial attitude is antithetical 4 l to that expressed two years earlier
by the same court in Commonwealth v. Gardner,42 where a criminal prose-
cution of doctors and nurses of a birth control clinic was sustained under the
same statute. The court in the earlier case was swayed by the policy argument
that complete prohibition of the sale of contraceptives was necessary to sup-
press immorality. 43 The implied rejection. of this argument in the Corbell
case is a recognition of the failure of prohibitory legislation to curtail the
sale of contraceptives. The notorious unenforceability of such statutes is
evidenced by the flourishing bootleg industry which prospers in spite of
them.44 These laws, by driving the industry underground, have impaired
32. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). But ef. Mr. Justice Roberts dis-
senting, id. at 338.
33. I.e., Comstock's organization. See BROUN AND LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK
(1927) 128-144.
34. Le., the Catholic organizations. See note 16 supra.
35. See public opinion polls in 14 FORTUNE (1936) 158; 55 LADIES HOME J. (1938)
14-15.
36. 29 N. E. (2d) 151 (Mass., 1940).
37. MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 272, § 21. Advertising, manufacture, and gift of
contraceptives are also forbidden in this statute.
38. MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 111, §§ 116-121; Am. Laws 1937, c. 391.
39. WARREN, ON YOUR GUARD (1937) 74, 81.
40. The buyer's intent to use illegally must be known to the vendor. "As a practical
matter, under the construction of the statute adopted by the opinion, it would be almost
impossible ever to obtain a conviction under this statute . . . The construction . . .
leaves the statute as a whole without practical effect." Donahue, J., dissenting, in Com-
monwealth v. Corbett, 29 N. E. (2d) 151, 156 (Mass. 1940).
41. The court did not distinguish the Gardner case, but simply measured the Com-
monwealth's anti-contraception policy against its anti-venereal disease policy and chose
the latter.
42. 300 Mass. 372, 15 N. E. (2d) 222 (1938), appeal dism'd, 305 U. S. 559 (1939),
(1938) 7 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 255, (1938) 37 MIcH. L. Ray. 317.
43. Id. at 375, 15 N. E. (2d) at 223.
44. It is estimated that the industry does a business close to $250,000,000 a year. See
The Accident of Birth, 17 FORTUNE (1938) 85.
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effective government regulation and thus indirectly promote the sale of
worthless products at exorbitant prices.
45
Besides taking a new view on this important point of policy, the Massa-
chusetts court has revised its manner of statutory construction. In the
Gardner case it refused to go beyond the words of the statute - written sixty
years previously, in a radically different context - which, in its opinion, were
"directed with undeviating explicitness against the prevention of conception"
and consequently foreclosed the issue.40 In marked contrast, the same court
in the Corbett case read a devastating exception into the all-inclusive terms
of the same statute so that it would harmonize with other manifestations of
legislative policy. Although the anomalous situation of dosed birth control
clinics alongside free sale of those contraceptives adapted to preventing
venereal disease is highly undesirable, the Massachusetts court's action in
abandoning the "ostrich" method of statutory construction augurs well for
sound future judicial interpretation of the birth control laws of that state.
Once the propriety of construing obscenity laws in the light of their purpose
and effect is established, the available evidence would seem to sustain the
conclusions of the federal courts in permitting an exception for use under
medical direction. Yet in State v. Nelson 47 the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors construed the statute strictly, as was done in the Gardner case,
instead of following the federal decisions. The familiar pattern of criminal
prosecution of doctors and nurses of a birth control clinic was involved, and
the court, in reversing an acquittal below, refused to make a medical exception
for such a clinic. The court expressly restricted its decision to the case where
contraceptives were used to preserve a woman's "general health." 43 In hold-
ing such use illegal the court indicated that, since general health might be
construed broadly enough to include any pregnancy per se, the effect of the
45. Manufacturers make a profit of 120%. Retailers' profits run upwyards of 300%.
Id. at 112.
46. 300 Mass. 372, 375, 15 N. E. (2d) 222, 223 (1938).
47. 126 Conn. 412, 11 A. (2d) 856 (1940), 20 B. U. L. Ray-. 551. The statute in-
volved forbade use of contraceptives. See note 12 supra.
48. Id. at 418, 11 A. (2d) at 859. Reluctant to make extensive commitments in cases
brought up on demurrer, as birth control cases often are, appellate courts have frequently
avoided the constitutional problems inhering in attempted complete prohibition of the
use of contraceptives. Consequently, judicial authority that all-inclusive prohibitions of
contraceptives are constitutional is not convincing. State v. Arnold, 217 Wis. 340, 258
N. W. 843 (1935) and McConnell v. Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S. W. (2d) 478, 113
A. L. R. 966 (1937) involved specific statutory restrictions on commercial distribution.
Ptople v. Sanger, 222 N. Y. 192, 118 N. E. 637 (1918), nri of error dism'd, 251 U. S.
537 (1919) and People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163 N. Y. S. 682 (1917) concerned a spe-
cific medical exception. In both Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 X. E. 265
(1917) and the Gardner case, the constitutional point %vas scarcely mentioned and the
'conclusion in favor of constitutionality wvas virtually assumed. For the view that com-
plete prohibition would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of life and liberty without
due process, see (1939) 6 U. or CHi. L. Rav. 260, 263. The argument is based on the case
of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905), where the United States Supreme
Court said that a compulsory vaccination statute would be unconstitutional if applied to
a person whose health would thereby be endangered.
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entire statute could be destroyed by the exception. 49 The situation where a
woman's life would be endangered by pregnancy was specifically reserved
for future decision.50
A subsequent decision by the Connecticut court permitting the use of
contraceptives under medical direction when pregnancy would threaten per-
manent injury to a woman's health would allow birth control clinics to exert
their full powers in promoting maternal and infant welfare in that state. Such
clinical activity is not possible in Massachusetts, however, since the Corbctt
case allows birth control only insofar as it can be practised on the pretext
of preventing the spread of venereal disease.r' In both states courts have
yet to achieve the desirable result of the federal decisions which permit phy-
sicians to prescribe contraceptives to protect their patients' general health.
None of the exceptions so far judicially adopted by either state or federal
courts, however, would recognize an economic justification for birth control,
although advocates of birth control assert that immense social benefits would
result from instruction of the poorer classes so that the size of families might
be correlated with the size of family incomes. 2 The process of legalizing birth
control by judicial exception to superficially prohibitive statutes must, by the
very nature of the judicial process, be a slow and halting one; the tentative
steps taken by the Massachusetts court consequently must be approved.53 At
the same time, it should be recognized that a substantial field for interpretation
remains within which the judiciary may assist the birth control movement to
attain the maturity that social analysis indicates is warranted - a maturity in
which birth control will be extended beyond instances where health is impaired
or venereal disease is threatened to embrace economic aspects of the problem.
To deal with this economic problem, birth control clinics specifically chartered
to assist and advise those classes whose economic status suggests the desir-
49. 126 Conn. 412, 425, 11 A. (2d) 856, 862 (1940).
50. The significance of the Nelson case depends upon the legality of the use of con-
traceptives under these circumstances and, necessarily, the breadth of meaning which will
be accorded to the phrase "general health." A compromise test might well be the per-
manency of the threatened harm, i.e., whether the injury suffered would be lasting or
would be only that which inevitably accompanies pregnancy. This would avoid whittling
away the statute by the exception and would leave doctors free to promote health.
51. Health would be the sole objective of such a policy in Connecticut and all con-
traceptives would, in theory, be distributed through clinics or sold on doctors' prescrip-
tions. In Massachusetts, on the other hand, contraceptives capable of preventing disease
are salable when the druggist is unaware of the buyer's intention to use them illegally.
Since this intent is virtually impossible to prove, free sale of some contraceptives exists
in Massachusetts.
52. SANGER, My FIGHT FOR BIrTH CONTROL (1931) 300.
53. Approval of attitude is not endorsement of present results. Devices generally
prescribed by the clinics are not ordinarily adapted for prevention of venereal disease
except insofar as diseased mothers are prevented from having infected children, and the
Corbett case would not seem to permit reopening of clinics. While these expert services
are suspended, inferior types of contraceptives are being distributed in undesirable ways




ability of reasonable family limitation might be accorded an experimental
recognition.
POSITION OF CORPORATE TRUSTEE SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT
FOR UNDISCLOSED ADVANCES*
THE trustee for bondholders has traditionally occupied an anomalous posi-
tion, described by the courts as something between a depositary and an or-
dinary trustee.' The indenture is typically more concerned with exculpatory
clauses than with defining the trustee's duties.2 Yet the bondholders' complete
reliance on the trustee,3 as well as the connotations of the label, have caused
some courts to look beyond the terms of the deed to find the proper standards
for the trustee's conduct.4 Definition of these standards is relatively unim-
54. Broadening of birth control along the lines suggested, with the parallel expan-
sion of clinics to the status of national institutions, would necessitate some sort of super-
vision. This might be patterned on the corporate scheme, with charters granted by the
states with specific purposes and powers set forth in them. The courts would act as en-
forcing agencies in proper clinical administration under this plan. Licensing of private
clinics through administrative tribunals is another possible regulatory device. But see
People v. Dever, 236 Ill. App. 135 (1925). State ownership and operation would be a
third possibility. Compare the North Carolina system, supra note 28.
* Adams v. Reading Trust Co., 34 F. Supp. 944 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
1. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 422, 20 N. W.
862, 864 (1933) ; 2 JoNES, BO NDS AND BOND SECURITIES (4th ed. 1935) § 1053. On the
subject of a trustee's duties generally, see Posner, Liability of the Trustee inder the
Corporate Indenture (1928) 42 H.tnv. L. REv. 198; Posner, The Tritsce and the Trust
Indenture: A Further Study (1937) 46 YAE L. J. 737.
2. The purpose of the office has been to provide a nominee to hold the mortgage
and an agency through which the bondholders may act in certain circumstances. It is
almost invariably provided that the trustee need not take action on default without a
request from a stated percentage of the bondholders. Exculpatory clauses commonly
exempt the trustee from liability in all cases save gross negligence or bad faith. See,
generally, 2 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 811, 1030 ct scq.; McCaz.N.o AND FIsHER,
CoRPoRATE MORTGAGE BOND IssuES (1937) pp. 774 ct seq. (including the relevant clauses
of a typical indenture); Posner, supra note 1.
The small compensation of the trustee for his ordinary tasks has been a factor in
limiting his functions. See, however, SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INvESTIGATION
OF THE WOREr, AcriviEs, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROcT=Iu% AND REOncc:,i-
ZATiON CosmTrmais [hereinafter referred to as SEC REorR] Pt. V'I (1936) 67-70 (and
Appendix B), suggesting that while higher compensation could legitimately be demanded
for the services which a trustee should perform, the existing low fees were "exorbitant"
for the actual work they did.
3. Being widely separated and having no access to the company lists, the bond-
holders are greatly handicapped both in learning of defaults and in getting requests from
the required percentage of their number to force the trustee into action. See SEC Rnoar,
Pt. I1 (1936) 29-35.
4. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Imv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N. W. 862
(1933) ; see Lyman v. Stevens, 123 Conn. 591, 197 At. 313 (1938). Contra: Hallett v.
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portant so long as the mortgagor prospers. Where default has occurred,
however, the 'trustee's assumption of conflicting interests which a stricter
fiduciary standard would forbid has often resulted in serious losses to the
bondholders.6
Recent legislation, notably the Trust Indenture Act,7 has established rules
of conduct calculated to eliminate this danger in the future.8 But many types
of securities remain free from legislative restriction,0 leaving a field where
the courts, in allocating loss, must determine the duties to which the trustee
is to be held. This they must do when the trustee has advanced funds from
its own pocket to conceal the mortgagor's default of interest, and seeks reim-
bursement after the insolvency of one or both precipitates a reckoning.'0
Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 185 N. E. 474 (1933); Anderson v. Pennsylvania Hotel Co., 56
F. (2d) 980 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932). An interesting example of the attitude of certain courts
is found in the opinion of Rosenman, J., in Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc.
57, 83-6, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541, 569-72 (Sup. Ct. 1936), excoriating the particular inden-
ture in that case and the system in general, but deciding reluctantly in favor of defend-
ant trustee on the ground that it had fulfilled the negligible functions imposed upon it
by the deed, and that remedial measures were for the legislature.
5. Unless the indenture contains provisions imposing on the trustee the duty to
control application of the proceeds or to supervise sinking fund or redemption provisions,
its tasks are ordinarily confined to authentication and registration. See Posner, supra
note 1, 42 HARv. L. Rav. 198.
6. Through failure to notify them that their security has been jeopardized. By their
ignorance the bondholders may either suffer from a decline in the value of the property
before foreclosure, or they may lose control of protective committees to those affiliated
with the issuer. For a discussion of the methods used to gain control of these commit-
tees see SEC REPORT, Pt. III (1936) §§ 3 and 4, and Pt. VI (1936) 71-80.
7. 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77aaa et seq. (Supp. 1940).
8. Major provisions of the Act disqualify as trustee all those with existing or poten-
tial conflicting interests in the security; compel the trustee to inform the bondholders
within ninety days of any default in interest, principal, sinking fund, or redemption re-
quirements; set a standard for the trustee in case of default to conduct himself as a
prudent man would in managing his own affairs; and forbid clauses excusing the trustee
for its own negligence in acting or failing to act.
The 1933 amendment to the National Banking Act prohibited national banks from
underwriting security issues, thereby preventing one very important class of trustees
from assuming one insidious type of conflicting interest. 48 STAT. 184 (1933), 12 U. S.
C. §24 (1934). 78% of the trustees replying to the SEC questionnaire were banks.
SEC REPORT, Pt. VI (1936) 99.
9. The Trust Indenture Act contains many exemptions, the two most important being
issues of less than $1,000,000, and, of course, intrastate bonds. 53 STAT. 1153 (1939),
15 U. S. C. A. §§ 77 ddd (a) (4) and (9) (Supp. 1940).
10. Provisions in the indenture allowing advances by the trustee in other types of
default and granting it liens therefor are common. Where there is a clause putting the
trustee's lien ahead of the bondholders, the courts will sometimes be guided by the in-
denture, sometimes by a higher conception of fiduciary conduct. Marshall & Isley Bank
v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N. W. 862 (1933) (disallowing lien for taxes
and ground rent). Contra: Hallett v. Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 185 N. E. 474 (1933)
(funds to complete construction work). The courts generally limit themselves to an
interpretation of what the indenture allows unless it appears to be too unjust. Lyman v.
Stevens, 123 Conn. 591, 197 Atl. 313 (1938) ; Hallett v. Moore, supra.
NOTES
In this situation a variety of legal concepts can be used to protect the bond-
holders.
A case now pending before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals raises many
of the problems involved in settling the status of the trustee, but provides
little guidance for their solution." A national bank took an individual's
mortgage and sold bonds on this security to the public, including many of its
own depositors.'- The bank acted as trustee and serviced the mortgage,
collecting the interest and paying it over to the bondholders. The mortgagor
defaulted on two of the interest payments, but the bank paid the amount
from its own funds on the due dates. No notice was given to the bondholders
that their income was not coming from the usual source. Shortly after the
second advance of interest the bank failed, and the mortgage was foreclosed
by the conservator of its assets. Later the plaintiff was appointed receiver
of the bank. The mortgaged premises were sold and are now held in trust
for the bondholders. Plaintiff asked that the bondholders, their substituted
trustee, and the mortgagor's estate be directed to repay the advances and
that a lien for this amount be declared upon the mortgaged property." The
court refused relief, holding that its decision was controlled by recent Penn-
sylvania cases indistinguishable from the one at bar.'4 It further found that
the transaction was not an ultra vircs act of the bank and observed that if
there was a debt owing for the advances, it was owed to the bank in its
individual capacity, not as trustee.'"
Although, in directing its attention entirely to the arguments urged by the
receiver, the district court did not decide the important issue of whether or
not the bank had committed a breach of trust,'" it seems clear that no court
would be justified in permitting the trustee's own interests to come into con-
11. Adams v. Reading Trust Co., 34 F. Supp. 944 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
12. The terms of the bond indenture do not appear in the record and apparently
played no part in the case.
13. This action arose upon an accounting of the bank's trusteeship, from which the
plaintiff sought a release.
14. Klein v. Adams, 31 Berks Co. L. J. 241 (1939), aff'd sub nora. Klein v. Dunn,
337 Pa. 480, 12 A. (2d) 56 (1940); Media-69th St. Trust Company's Trust Mortgage
Pool Case, 329 Pa. 587, 197 At. 918, 115 A. L. R. 869, 872 (1938) ; Klein's Estate, 326
Pa. 393, 190 Atl. 882 (1937) ; Estate of Nauman, 110 Pa. Super. 55, 167 Ad. 395 (1933).
Plaintiff argued that the case was not controlled by Pennsylvania decisions under the
doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, since it concerned the powers of a national bank
and, therefore, presented a federal question. The court, however, apparently felt either
that no federal question was involved or that its determination wvas not essential to the
decision. The matter is dismissed briefly in Adams v. Reading Trust Co., 34 F. Supp.
944, 945 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
15. The mere fact that a beneficiary is indebted to the trustee does not entitle the
trustee to pay himself out of the trust property. 2 Scow, TRYSTS (1939) § 250.
Although it is not clear on what grounds the theory of debt to the trustee as an indi-
vidual arose, it seems to have been properly discarded. See Klein v. Dunn, 337 Pa. 480,
484, 12 A. (2d) 56, 57 (1940).
16. Probably because it felt obliged to decide the case solely on the basis of the Penn-
sylvania authorities, though those cases make no explicit decisions on the question of
breach.
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flict with those of the bondholders.17 Such a conflict would inevitably arise
in the case of a trustee which made advances of interest to the bondholders
without disclosing the default. If, by paying the interest as it came due, it
expected to be subrogated to the rights of the bondholders against the mort-
gagor for that amount, it would be acquiring an interest adverse to the cestuls
by seeking to share with them pro rata in the security. The creation of a
banker-customer connection between the trustee and mortgagor would like-
wise be clearly antagonistic to the interests of the bondholders.1 S This rela-
tionship would result if the advances were considered loans in the course
of business to the mortgagor.19 Finally, as banker for the bondholders or as
underwriter of the issue, the trustee would be tempted to value the market-
ability of its bonds and its reputation for good judgment more highly than
the safety of the bondholders.
2 0
In cases where no breach of trust appears, an estoppel by misrepresentation
may be raised to prevent recovery by the erring trustee. The necessary ele-
ments of this defense are inherent in the position of the trustee which advances
interest without informing the bondholders of their danger- provided the
resulting damage can be shown. Estoppel would be a flexible device in the
hands of the court to supplement the terms of the indenture contract.
If the mortgagor is in bankruptcy, a further means of protecting the bond-
holders against the trustee's claim is available. It could be argued that the
trustee's claim should be subordinated on the basis of the court's recently
reasserted plenary powers to subordinate or disallow claims "to see that
injustice or unfairness is not done." 2 1 In the past this power of subordination
has been used chiefly to prevent profits from fraud in parent-subsidiary con-
nections 22 and in claims of officers and dominant stockholders against their
corporations,23 but it has lately been given broader scope.2 4 The Supreme
17. For suggestions as to the effect a trustee's relation to the parties may have upon
his duties, see 2 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1042, 1053; MCCLELLAND & FISHER, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 795; Posner, supra note 1.
18. The positions of short-term and long-term creditor are likely to be in conflict
and cannot then be served faithfully by the same agency. See SEC REPORT, Pt. VI (1936)
83-99. But see Posner, supra note 1, 46 YALE L. J. 737, 792-3, suggesting that the ad-
vantages of a creditor-trustee relationship outweigh its disadvantages.
19. The bank gave the mortgagor no direct notice that it had paid the interest, but
it is not too much to imagine that he became aware of the advances when no action was
taken after his defaults. See Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Hackett, 213 Wis. 426, 434, 250
N. W. 866, 869 (1933).
20. This factor has received judicial attention. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Rick-
etts, 75 F. (2d) 309, 312 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Klein v. Dunn, 337 Pa. 480, 485, 12 A.
(2d) 56, 58 (1940) ; First Trust Co. v. Carlsen, 129 Neb. 118, 124, 261 N. W. 333, 337
(1935).
21. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 308 (1939). See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec.
Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939) ; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 881.
22. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939); Henry v. Dolley, 99
F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938).
23. Alexander v. Theleman, 69 F. (2d) 610 (C. 'C. A. 10th, 1934), ceri. denied, 293
U. S. 581 (1934); In re Chas. K. Horton, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 905 (S. D. Tex. 1938).
24. "Where . . . investigation discloses the existence of . . ., a breach of fidu-
ciary obligations . .. , the court has ample power to adjust the remedy to meet the
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Court has held that certain claims made in a composition under Chapter IX
should have been subordinated in the absence of proof that the claimant had
disclosed its three-fold interest in soliciting assents to the plan." The same
reasoning would support a subordination of the trustee's claim where it had
assumed a conflicting position, although it is doubtful whether the courts
would exercise so broad an equitable power in cases other than bankruptcy. -0
Greater difficulties may be encountered in forcing the trustee to assume
the burden of its mismanagement if it is in a position to invoke the legis-
lative restrictions on banking powers, and seeks to have its action set aside
as ultra vires. The trustee bank can take the position that it possesses no
powers beyond those specifically granted by statute.2 7 A bank is not per-
mitted to guarantee real estate mortgages,28 and the assumption of the risk
of loss by payment of interest in the absence of guaranty would seem to fall
under the same ban. If the bank should receive no enforceable obligation
in return for its advances, a second ground appears on which the transaction
can be held unauthorized. The payments must be considered a gift of its
assets. This argument fails to consider the possibility that the bank might
be given a claim against the mortgagor, or a subordinated claim against the
premises, in which event the transaction would be saved from classification
as a gift, though in many cases such treatment would prevent recovery. It
could be argued, moreover, that the bank is estopped to plead idtra vires.
since restitution would be impossible for the bondholders." On this contract
analogy, however, the bank might make use of the theory that an ldtra Tires
contract, being a nullity, gives rise to no rights.30
Even if it were established that the bank is estopped to assert that the
payments were ultra vires, because of the change of position by the bond-
need." American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fa., 61 Sup. Ct. 157,
162 (U. S. 1940).
25. American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 61 Sup. Ct.
157 (U. S. 1940).
26. Language used in at least one non-bankruptcy case suggests that the court v.-as
thinldng in terms of subordination on equitable grounds. Coffey v. Lawman, 99 F. (2d)
245, 248 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
27. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorf, 291 U. S. 245 (1934); California NaL Bank v.
Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362 (1897); Logan County Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67 (1891).
28. 39 STAT. 753 (1916), 12 U. S. C. §92 (1934).
29. This would be a slight variant from the majority view that an executed contract
will not be disturbed because it was ultra vires, but one that seems fully justified by the
same reasons. See Coffey v. Lawman, 99 F. (2d) 245 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); 1 ZoLL-
MAN, BANKS AND BANEING (1936) §§ 196, 344; 5 id. § 3035.
30. The "special capacity" doctrine, still apparently followed by the Supreme Court
and a minority of other jurisdictions. Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Bank, 295 U. S. 209 (1935) ;
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorf, 291 U. S. 245 (1934); Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's
Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 (1891). But cf. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'.ene Mines Co.,
9 U. S. L. WVEEK 4142 (1941), enforcing a partially executed contract forbidden by SEC
regulations. One authority has examined all the justifications commonly used to sup-
port the theory of limited capacity and has concluded that they constitute no valid rea-
son for such a rule. The erroneous notion that a corporation possesses limited capacity
to contract seems to underlie the whole doctrine. Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codifica-
tion and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALE L J. 297.
19411
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
holders, it is questionable whether the receiver of an insolvent bank will be
barred on the same basis. The doctrine that the receiver is subject to all
existing defenses and claims against the bank 3 ' has apparently been modified
by two recent decisions of the Supreme Court.32 The holdings, however,
seem to be based largely on policy considerations which favored the receiver.
In the situation at hand, the fiduciary obligation owed by the bank to the
bondholders and the protection of the investing public are important factors
to counterbalance the arguments for the receiver as representative of the
depositors and creditors.
Other theories advanced to enable the trustee to recover are less persuasive,
at least in the absence of special circumstances. To become subrogated to
the rights of the bondholders, the trustee would have to show some compulsion
to advance the money.33 Since there is no suretyship, no agreement implicit
in the circumstances to make up deficiencies, and no legitimate interest of
its own in the property which the trustee must protect, it could hardly escape
classification as a volunteer. It seems equally implausible to consider the
transaction as a purchase of the mortgagees' rights. There must be either an
express or implied assent to the purchase.3 4 A different rule would allow the
diminution of the mortgagees' security to the vanishing point without their
knowledge. As an alternative to subrogation or purchase, contention for
recovery on the theory that the payments were a loan to the bondholders
seems unconvincing in view of the fact that they were unaware that any
new relationship arose between them and the trustee. The advances might
well be considered a loan to the mortgagor, but to establish such a claim would
be only to acquire the standing of an unsecured creditor and would therefore
be small comfort to the trustee. One last possibility for recovery would be
a suit for money paid under mistake, either of fact or of law. 0 An essential
element of this action, however, is the ability to restore the payee to his
former position.30 In a case where failure to foreclose a mortgage in season
was the result of the payment, it would of course be impossible to make the
bondholders whole.
31. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); see Crawford Co. v. Dixon, 22 F.
Supp. 636, 638 (E. D. S. C. 1938).
32. City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262 (1934) ; Texas & P. Ry. v. Pottorf,
291 U. S. 245 (1934). See also Lyman v. Stevens, 123 Conn. 591, 197 AtI. 313 (1938).
33. Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Byers, 100 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 3d,
1938); Account of Commonwealth Trust Co., Trustee, No. 1, 247 Pa. 508, 93 Atl. 766
(1915); See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACrs (2d ed. 1936) § 1274.
34. Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U. S. 416 (1888); First Trust Co. of Lin-
coln v. Ricketts, 75 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Iowa Water Co., 78 Fed. 881 (C. C. S. D. Ia., 1897).
35. It is uncertain whether the trustee could establish either. The cases granting
relief seem almost always to involve a mistake of fundamental fact, whereas in the prin-
cipal case the only "fact" mistaken was the future ability of the mortgagor to pay. Money
paid under mistake of law cannot as a rule be recovered. SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
(22d ed. 1939) 453.
36. 5 WILLISTON, CONTACTS (2d ed. 1936) § 1595; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
(1937) § 148 (1), comment a.
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The office of bondholders' trustee has developed in an atmosphere inimical
to a real trust relationship. The unique features of this "trust" are said to
represent a compromise worked out by tile courts between a standard so
strict that even worthy institutions would not undertake the responsibilities
and one so lax that the bondholders would be insufficiently protected.37 If
such an adjustment of policy considerations goes so far to accommodate the
parties to the contract that it allows the trustee to assume interests conflicting
with its duties to the bondholders, the result is no compromise at all. Where
the courts address themselves to the task of creating an instrumentality of
real use to the investing public, they will find means at their disposal to add
fiduciary duties to the existing agency relationship. By refusing to counten-
ance the actions of a trustee who has jeopardized the beneficiaries under cover
of the indenture contract, the courts can erect more satisfactory standards
for this office without adding greatly to its burdens.
EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS UNDER CONFLICTING TERMS IN COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENT AND INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT*
ENCOURAGEMENT of the principle of collective bargaining in the United
States has lent urgency to the problem of defining the legal status of col-
lective agreements between unions and employers.' Efforts to insert a
twentieth-century relationship into common law pigeon-holes have fostered
a conceptual confusion in labor law from which legal devices adapted to
handle a variety of issues are only gradually emerging. 2 The difficulties of
the development are nowhere more striking than in the determination of
the individual employee's rights under a collective agreement.3
37. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 422, 250 N. W.
862, 864 (1933).
*Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 103 P. (2d) 1095 (Wash. 1940) ; McNeil
v. Hacker, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 432 (City Ct. 1940).
1. The ruling of the Supreme Court that the National Labor Relations Board may
require employers to sign written agreements has given added importance to the ques-
tion. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 61 Sup. Ct. 320 (1940). See Ward, The Mechanics
of Collective Bargaining (1940) 53 HAxv. L. REv. 754, 777.
2. See Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L. J.
195.
3. See Witmer, supra note 2, at 224 et seq.; Hamilton, Inditidual Rights Arising
from Collective Labor Contracts (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 252; Anderson, Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements (1936) 15 OnE. L. REv. 229, 235 et seq.; Christenson, Legally En-
forceable Interests in American Labor Union Worling Agreements (1933) 9 I:wD. L J.
69; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in Arneiican Law (1931) 44 HAnv. L. RPm. 572;
Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1925) 10 ST. Lois L RE,. 1;
Comment (1938) 51 HARv. L. Ray. 520.
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Three theories have been invoked by the courts to define the relationship
among employee, union, and employer. Under the first, the union is regarded
as agent for the individual employee in negotiating a contract with the em-
ployer.4 The second interprets the collective agreement as a custom or usage
which governs the individual contract in the absence of specific conflicting
provisions.5 Recent decisions, on the other hand, have adopted the view that
the union contracts for the benefit of the employee, who may enforce his
rights as a third party beneficiary.6
Under any of the approaches adopted, the individual employee's rights
may be thwarted and the efficacy of collective bargaining undermined
by the employer's superior bargaining power.7 Fear of losing his job may deter
the employee from attempting to enforce his rights under the collective bargain,
and financial handicaps may impel him to settle or compromise his suit and
thus forego his full rights. If the employer, moreover, can show that he has
contracted with the individual on terms less advantageous to the latter than
those prescribed in the union agreement, he may succeed in insulating himself
against recovery by an employee demanding wages at the union rate.8 The
agency rationale, for example, would allow modification of the collective agree-
ment by an employee who is regarded as the union's principal. Treatment of
the collective bargain as a usage or custom, furthermore, is predicated on the
4. Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935) ; cf. Yazoo
& M. V. R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594, 161 So. 860 (1935). Ratification by the indi-
vidual union members is frequently required. See JAEGER, CASES AND STATrUEs ON LABOR
LAW (1939) 764.
5. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cerf. granted,
61 Sup. Ct. 392 (U. S. 1940) ; Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 152 Ky. 711,
154 S. W. 47 (1913).
6. McGlohn v. Gulf & S. I. R. R., 179 Miss. 396, 174 So. 250 (1937); Yazoo &
M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931); Gulla v. Barton, 164 App.
Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914). The courts have often confused different
rationales or avoided clear definition to reach a desired result. See Comment (1938)
51 HARV. L. REv. 520, 521, n. 10. The question is now before the Supreme Court. Illinois
Cent. R. R. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 392
(U. S. 1940).
7. See COMMONS AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGIsLATION (4th rev. ed.
1936) 372; TAYLOR, LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR LAW (1938) 182.
8. In cases where the employee sues for union wages, the individual contract on
which the employer relies is ordinarily subsequent to the collective bargain. For the same
result where the defense was based on a prior individual contract, see Gulickson v. Seglin
Construction Co., 152 Misc. 624, 273 N. Y. Supp. 908 (City Ct. 1934) (evidence of oral
union agreement inadmissible to vary terms of prior employment ticket). For authority
that a prior individual contract is superseded by a collective agreement more beneficial
to the employee, see Individual Damp Wash Laundry Co. v. Meyers, 10 Ohio 0. 517
(C. P. 1938); cf. Strobe v. Netherland Co., 245 App. Div. 573, 578, 283 N. Y. Supp.
246, 253 (4th Dep't 1935). Where the employee asserts an individual claim, the courts
seem reluctant to permit an employer to use the collective bargain as a defense. Witmer,
supra note 2, at 229, n. 116; see Ahlquist v. Alaska-Portland Packers' Ass'n, 39 F. (2d)
348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
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absence of conflicting private contracts of employment.0 And third party
beneficiary doctrines may fail to relieve an employee who has waived his
rights under the group contract by accepting less beneficial terms.10
Illustrative of the obstacles which arise to block recovery by the individual
is the decision in a recent Washington case."1 A non-union employee was
hired at a low wage after his employer had entered into a collective agree-
ment. Although the employee subsequently joined the union, he continued
to receive wages well below those stipulated in the union contract. Each
Saturday he endorsed and cashed without protest checks containing the clause
"endorsement of this check is acknowledgment of payment account in full as
follows." Recognizing the right of a union member to sue on the collective
agreement, the court maintained that the union agreement could not divest
the individual employee of the right to make a conflicting contract with his
employer, and held the plaintiff estopped from claiming compensation from
that time at the union wage.
The result may be proper if conventional contract law is to be applied.12
Principles of accord and satisfaction preclude recovery by the employee who
accepts checks purporting to be payment in full,13 and his rights may be
waived if, with knowledge of the collective bargain, he contracts for a lower
wage before entering employment. 14 The result has been reached under
similar facts where the collective bargain, rationalized in terms of usage, was
held vitiated by an independent agreement resulting from the employee's
acceptance of lower wagesj 5 Realization, however, that the individual is at
a disadvantage in contracting for employment and that effective collective
bargaining is impossible if evasion by the employer is sanctioned has been
responsible for efforts of other courts to permit the employee to recover the
difference between the wage actually paid and the amount to which the group
contract entitled him. Various grounds have been offered for refusing to
9. See Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 463, 9 S. NV. (2d) 692,
694 (1928). Some courts have demanded evidence of adoption in the individual contract.
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. V. 136 (1904); Keysaw v. Dotter-
weich Brewing Co., 121 App. Div. 58, 105 N. Y. Supp. 562 (4th Dep't 1907). See
Anderson, loc. cit. .supra note 3.
10. Disclaimer by the beneficiary, however, should not bar the union's effort to
uphold its wage scale by suing for breach of the contract as to it. See Rr'sTArmim;T,
CoNTRAcTs (1932) § 137, comment a. Pressure on the employee might induce waiver
even after recovery. Cf. Fleming v. Warshawsky Co., 9 U. S. L. WEzu 2363 (N. D.
i1. 1940).
11. Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 103 P. (2d) 1095 (Wash. 1940).
12. 1 ,VIMLISTON, CONRAcrS (rev. ed. 1938) §§128, 129; 6 id. §§18S4-1856;
RESTATEmzNT, CONTRACrS (1932) § 417 et seq. See Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard,
161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
13. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; see Rolandez
v. Star Liquor Dealers, 257 App. Div. 97, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 17 (Ist Dep't 1939) ; Herman
v. Golden Arrow Dairy, Inc., 191 Wash. 582, 71 P. (2d) 581 (1937).
14. See Harris v. Levy Trucking Co., 4 LAB. Rm. REP. 972 (N. Y. City Ct. 1939).
15. Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. Supp. 38 (4th
Dep't 1910); see Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
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sustain the employer's defense based on a conflicting individual contract.10
Modification of a collective agreement negotiated by an association of em-
ployers has been held nugatory in the absence of consent by all the con-
tracting parties.' 7 The fact that the employee was unaware of the collective
agreement is sufficient to preclude waiver of his rights by accepting inade-
quate compensation.' 8 The courts, moreover, strain to find no meeting of
minds sufficient to validate the private and conflicting contract alleged by
the employer.' 9
Other theories have been suggested to nullify the employer's defense.
20
On the analogy of decisions that wages prescribed in minimum wage statutes
may not be waived,2 ' it may be argued that the employee should similarly
not be permitted to waive benefits conferred by collective bargains. There
are, furthermore, possibilities for utilization of the rule making illegal a bar-
gain which involves breach of a contract with a third person.22 On the one
hand, the employee has made a contract,23 represented in the union articles2
4
or by-laws, 25 not to make independent contracts on terms inferior to those
set by his union. On the other, the collective bargain may have involved an
express undertaking by the employer not to negotiate such private contracts. 20
Even in the absence of such provisions, however, the argument is available
16. Recovery of the differential between the wages provided in the agreement and
those paid is sometimes allowed without extended comment. See Barth v. Addle Co.,
271 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. (2d) 34 (1936) ; Glicman v. Barker Painting Co., 227 App. Div.
585, 238 N.Y. Supp. 419 (1st Dep't 1930) ; H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426,
155 N. E. 154 (1926); Glenz v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 125 Wash. 650, 216 Pac.
842 (1923).
17. Reichert v. Quindazzi, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 284 (Munic. Ct. 1938). The court
admitted that the defendant might have modified, if he had contracted directly with
the union. Id. at 286.
18. Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914);
Mastell v. Salo, 140 Ark. 408, 215 S. W. 583 (1919).
19. Dierschow v. West Suburban Dairies, 276 Ill. App. 355 (1934).
20. See Witmer, supra note 2, at 236. One possibility is the rule that acceptance
of a lesser amount in satisfaction of a greater liquidated obligation is without considera-
tion. Pederson v. Portland, 144 Ore. 437, 24 P. (2d) 1031 (1933) ; see (1937) 46 YAL.
L. J. 706, 708; cf. Taylor v. Mathues, 112 Pa. Super. 169, 170 Atl. 309 (1934) ; Gleiiz
v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 125 Wash. 650, 216 Pac. 842 (1923).
21. City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P. (2d) 1178 (1935); Cato v.
Grendel Cotton Mills, 132 S. C. 454, 129 S. E. 203 (1925); Comment (1939) 52 HAIv.
L. REv. 646, 667.
22. RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs (1932) § 576; 6 WILUiSTON, CoNTRmAcTs (rev. ed.
1938) § 1738.
23. See Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 281, 177 N. E. 833, 834 (1931) (constitu-
tion and by-laws express contract defining privileges and duties of members); Gleason
v. Thomas, 117 W. Va. 550, 556, 186 S. E. 304, 306 (1936).
24. See, e.g., § 34 of. the Constitution of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union (in
effect June 22, 1939).
25. See Dierschow v. West Suburban Dairies, 276 Ill. App. 355, 363 (1934).
26. Lnmm rAx, THE CoLLEcT= LABOR AGREEMENT (1939) 78; INTERNATIONAL
LABOR OFricE, COLr.EcTivE AGREEMENTS (Studies and Reports, Ser. A, Industrial Rela-
tions, No. 39, 1936) 63.
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that public policy,27 embodied in labor relations legislation,23 forbids modi-
fication of collective agreements by individual contracts inconsistent therewith.
An approach which may reflect future treatment of the problem has recently
been adopted in a New York court.20 The employer had paid his employees
lower wages than those stipulated in an agreement he had signed with their
union. In answer to the employees' suit to recover the difference, he alleged
an oral modification of the collective agreement and the acceptance by the
plaintiffs of the lesser amounts paid. The court held modification impossible
without the union's consent and applied the doctrine of estoppel, not against
the plaintiffs, but against the defendant who had e.xpressly agreed with the
union not to negotiate such independent contracts. To support its decision,
the court invoked the public policy of the state as declared in its labor rela-
tions act 30 and in a so-called "kick-back" statute,3' making it a misdemeanor
to induce an employee to "kick back" any part of the wages to which he is
entitled under a collective agreement.32
Legislation in this country has not yet advanced beyond the point of stimu-
lating collective bargaining.33 Enforcement of the concluded agreement has
27. Compare City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P. (2d) 1178 (1935);
Burdette v. Broadview Dairy Co., 123 Wash. 158, 212 Pac. 181 (1923); Larsen v. Rice,
100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918). See Caivano v. Brill, 171 Misc. 293, 11 N.Y. S.
(2d) 498 (Munic. Ct. 1939) (employees recovered "kick-back" of wages on arguments
of duress, economic pressure, and public policy).
28. For interrelation betveen wage-hour legislation and collective agreements under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, see 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §207(b)
(Supp. 1940); 1 TELLER, LABoR DispuTrs AND CoLECTIVE BARGAnMNG (1940) § 176;
2 id. §402.
29. McNeill v. Hacker, 21 N.Y. S. (2d) 432 (City Ct 1940).
30. N. Y. LABOR Law § 700.
31. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 962(3) : "Whenever an agreement between a bona fide labor
organization and an employer or an association of employers requires that workmen shall
be paid an agreed wage or rate of wages for their services, it shall be unlawful for any
person, either for himself or any other person, to request, demand or receive, either
before or after such workman is engaged, that such workman pay back, return, donate,
contribute or give any part or all of said workman's wages, salary, or thing of value,
to any person, uporl the statement, representation or understanding that failure to comply
with such request or demand will prevent such workman from procuring or retaining
employment . . ." See Legis. (1940) 9 FoRuAnm L, REv. 144. For statutes making
it unlawful for an employer to withhold any part of the wage agreed upon in a col-
lective agreement, see CA.. LA OR CODE (Deering, 1937) § 222, amended by Stats. 1939,
c. 1062; Ky. Acts 1940, c. 105, art. 1, § 16.
32. For a discussion of the "kick-back" and legislation passed to combat it, see
Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. Ray. 733. The extension of the New York statute to
include collective agreements was foreshadowed by the courts' treatment of the previous
provision. See People v. Brill, 255 App. Div. 452, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 949 (1st Dep't 1938);
People v. Meyer, 167 Misc. 287, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 870 (Mag. Ct. 1938); People v.
Desowitz, 166 Misc. 1, 2 N.Y. S. (2d) 87 (Mag. Ct. 1938). For the federal "kick-back
racket" act, see United States v. Charlick, 26 F. Supp. 203 (E. D. Pa. 1939), 52 Hmv.
L. REv. 1366.
33. Section 7(a) of the NIRA was interpreted as prohibiting individual contracts of
employment less advantageous to the individual. See Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L REv.
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been left to suits by the union for an injunction restraining violatiofns 4 and
by individual employees seeking to safeguard their rights. Although the
inadequacies of this type of protection have been generally recognized, reme-
dial legislative action is still absent. Statutes in other countries, however,
expressly prohibit individual contracts conflicting with collective agreements86
In order completely to effectuate the collective agreement, normative effect,
automatically displacing terms in individual contracts less favorable to the
employee, is given by these statutes to the provisions included for the in-
dividual's benefit in the agreement with the union. 0 The normative terms,
moreover, may be extended by administrative action to govern employment
by concerns not included in the agreement.3 7
The New York decision is an approach towards such a treatment of the
collective bargain. Resort to public policy arguments will, as in that case,
avoid restraints imposed by contract rules formulated from a two-party point
of view. If, furthermore, the courts, in the absence of legislation specifically
prohibiting contractual departures from the collective agreement,83 openly
1529, 1535; Chicago Defender, Inc., 1 1N. L. R. B. (old ser.) 119, 121. The status of
individual contracts under the National Labor Relations Act is in some doubt. In
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937) the Supreme Court said: "The
Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel
any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the employer 'from refusing to make a
collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by uni-
lateral action determine.'" See also Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300
U. S. 515, 548 (1937). The NLRB, however, has held that the Supreme Court has not
sanctioned the making of individual contracts as a permissible alternative to collective
bargaining after the employees have selected representatives. The Stolle Corporation,
13 N. L. R. B. 370 (1939) ; Schierbrock Motors, 15 N. L. R. B. 1109 (1939). Compare
Hoeniger, The Individual Employment Contract under the Wagner Act: 1 (1941) 10
FOROHAm L. REv. 14 and Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts under the
National Labor Relations Act (1939) 37 MicH. L. REv. 693, 697 c seq., with Ward,
supra note 1, at 787 et seq.
34. Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (lst Dep't 1922);
Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1928); Leveranz
v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 24 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 193 (C. P. 1922).
35. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, Op. cit. supra note 26, at 125; Fuchs, The French
Law of Collective Labor Agreements (1932) 41 YAI.E L. J. 1005, 1021 ; Fuchs, Collective
Labor Agreements in German Law (1929) 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 1; Robbins, The Juris-
diction of the Labor Court in Sweden (1940) 35 ILL. L. REv. 396, 397. See, e.g., Quebec
Law of April 20, 1934, STATuTEs OF QUEBEC, 24 GEo. V, c. 56, § 6.
36. These, of course, include not only wages, but hours, seniority, etc. Conflicting
terms in the individual contract prevail if they are more advantageous to the individual.
See 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, Faaanom OF AssociAriox (Studies and Reports,
Ser. A, Industrial Relations, No. 28, 1927) 110; Rice, supra note 3, at 576.
37. See Fuchs, supra note 35, 41 YALE L. J. at 1029; Hamburger, The E.rlension of
Collective Agreements to Cover Entire Trades and Industries (1939) 40 INT. LAB. REv.
153; Quebec statute, supra note 35, § 2.
38. For the view that normative effect is given the collective agreement under pro-
visions in the National Labor Relations Act on majority rule and the exclusiveness of
representation, see Hoeniger, supra note 33, at 35-38.
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adopt a normative rationale similar to that embodied in foreign statutes,
the collective bargain will be given the effectiveness which is fundamental
to its success.3 9
EFFECT OF ATTESTING WITNESSES' INTEREST UNDER LEGACY
PURGING STATUTES*
THE statutory requirement in Anglo-American law of a specified number
of competent attesting witnesses to a will' has served two significant but
quite different functions. One purpose is the protection of the testator against
imposition at the time of execution of the will; the other is to increase the
possibility of securing reliable evidence at probate, which may occur many
years after the will was executed. Emphasizing the evidentiary function of
attesting witnesses, a school of thought developed in England during the
eighteenth century which defined "competency" of an attesting witness as
his legal ability to testify when the will was probated.2 Since, under the rules
of evidence then existing, no party financially interested in the outcome of
a suit could testify,3 the claims of all necessary interested attesting witnesses
under a will had to be released or satisfied before they could sustain its
validity. Another school of thought, emphasizing the protective function
served by attesting witnesses, applied the existing evidentiary standard4 of
39. Some courts have used language which suggests a normative rationale. See
Chicago, R_ L & P. Ry. v. Sawyer, 176 Okla. 446, 447, 56 P. (2d) 418, 420 (1936) ;
Christiansen v. Local 680, 126 N. J. Eq. 508, 512, 10 A. (2d) 168, 171 (Ch. 1940):
"The contract between employer and union not only enters into the individual contract,
but it circumscribes the rights of the employer and the members of the union with respect
to making individual contracts of employment."
* Matter of Walters, 172 Mlisc. 207, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 8 (Surr. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259
App. Div. 1078, 21 N. Y. S. (Zd) 37 (2d Dep't 1940).
1. See Bordwell, The Statute Lau, of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. Rzv. 1, 17-18. In
many statutes the word "credible" rather than "competent" has been used. "Credible" in
this context, however, has been universally construed as meaning "competent." 1 PA, -,
WLs (2d ed. 1926) § 296. Even where there is no express statutory qualifications of
attesting witnesses, a judicial examination of the "competency" of attesting witnesses is
a recognized practice. Matter of Klinzner, 71 Misc. 620, 626, 130 N. Y. S. 1059, 1053
(Surr. Ct. 1911) (moral deficiencies); Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292 (1857) (competency
of an executor to attest).
2. Windham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 414, 97 Eng. Rep. 377 (1757).
3. ATKINsoN, WuLs (1937) 262.
4. Since the original standard of competency under both these views was the abil-
ity to testify-one at actual probate, the other at an imaginary probate held at the time
of attestation-it has been reasoned that the enabling acts which permit interested parties
to testify in all suits [see note 24 in!ra] also permit interested attestation. Hudson v.
Flood, 28 Del. 450, 94 AtI. 760 (1915) ; Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 417 (1873). Such rea-
soning can, of course, apply only in those states where statutes do not preclude the issue
by automatically purging an attesting legatee's gift, thus rendering him disinterested and
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disinterest to the actual time of attestation, 5 thus reaching the more severe
result of voiding a will attested by an interested party irrespective of his
release of interest.
The controversy between these two lines of approach centered mainly on
whether the testator could be adequately protected at execution of a will
without surrounding him with witnesses who were disinterested at that time.
To those who preferred ability to testify at probate as the measure of com-
petency, the danger of fraud or undue influence which could be cured by a
requirement of disinterested witnesses at execution of a will was unconvincing;
it was thought that a person bent on fraud could easily secure witnesses who
were disinterested at execution in the sense that they reaped no financial
gain under a will. 6 'An additional argument for the time-of-probate view
of competency was the fact that honest wills could be saved in part, while,
under an inflexible rule requiring disinterested attestation, they would have
been completely destroyed. 7 According to the attestation school, on the other
hand, the destruction of innocent wills 8 and the ineffectiveness of the strict
rule in some cases was a small, if necessary, price for the presumed myriad
competent to attest [see note 10 infra]. Though the enabling acts would undoubtedly end
any disqualification for interest under the time of probate view, this, of course, does not
necessarily follow under the time of attestation view. The definition of "competency"
requiring disinterested attestation developed from evidentiary rules, but the reasons lying
behind the definition stem from a desire to protect testators at the time of will execu-
tion. Since this desire is independent of the reasons behind the evidentiary requirement,
a change in the latter need not effect a change in the requirement of competency to
attest, as it has not in a majority of states. See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)
§ 582; Evans, The Competency of Testamentary Witnesses (1927) 25 Micu. L. REv.
238, 242.
5. Holdfast dem. Anstey v. Dowsing, 2 Strange 1253, 93 Eng. Rep. 1164 (1744);
see Lord Camden dissenting in Doe den. Hindson v. Kersey, 4 Burns Eccl, Law 27
(1765), reprinted in 1 Day 41 (Conn. 1802).
6. Windham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 414, 420, 97 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (1757).
7. The particular problem at which Lord Mansfield aimed in his famous opinion in
Windham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 414, 97 Eng. Rep. 377 (1757), was the validity of a will
attested by a creditor whose claims were made a charge on the testator's estate in a will,
but who had been paid prior to probate. At that time such a creditor was an interested
party at the time of attestation since creditors did not have recourse against the realty
of a deceased debtor in the absence of an express charge or lien. This problem could
never arise today. In most jurisdictions creditors are by statute made competent attest-
ing witnesses. In these and other jurisdictions other statutes, which automatically charge
a decedent's real estate with all claims, have removed any possible interest of a creditor
in a will charging an estate with his claim. 1 PAGE, WI.s (2d ed. 1926) § 310. Today
the problems caused by interested attestation generally arise when a legatee, his wife,
an executor, or an heir attest a will. See Evans, The Competency of Testamentary Wit-
nesses, (1927) 25 Mica L. Rzv. 238 passim.
8. See Lord Camden, dissenting in Doe dem. Hindson v. Kersey, 4 Burns Eccl. Law
27 (1765), reprinted in 1 Day 41, 50 (Conn. 1802) ("I am very sensible, that I am de-
stroying an honest will upon a nominal objection; for the interest here, which I must
treat as a serious incapacity, is too slight, even to disparage the witness's credit, if he
could be sworn . . .").
of cases in which incipient fraud had been checked.0 The ability of an inter-
ested attesting witness to release his gift and sustain i will, it was thought,
could lead only to perpetuation of his possible fraud by allowing him to sell
out to the highest bidder - the proponents or the contestants.
Today the question of the efficacy of a voluntary release of interest prior to
probate rarely arises, as statutes in most states and in England automatically
kill a gift to an attesting witness and make him competent to attest.10 Under
such a statute, occasion for considering the necessity of protecting a testator by
disinterested attestation seldom occurs.", These statutes validate wills attested
by interested witnesses much as if there were a release under the probate
test of competency, yet the statutes insure technically disinterested attestation' 2
by automatically destroying an interested attesting witness's gift. Often, how-
ever, such a statute, though designed to alleviate the inequitable consequences
of holding legatees incompetent to validate a will, 13 may also cause unneces-
sary hardship ;14 wills are attested in some cases by the required number
of disinterested witnesses in addition to a legatee.10 Recognizing this possi-
bility, many states have saved the interest of such a superfluous legatee-
witness by a clause in the purging statute making it inapplicable to his interest
if the will was "legally attested without the signature of such witness."'16
More ambiguous purging statutes in other states seem superficially similar
but may produce differing results. For example, a statute voiding a sub-
scribing legatee's gift if the will may not "otherwise be proved"17 is suscep-
tible of two interpretations. Some courts have construed such a statute as
the equivalent of the "legally attested" type,'8 holding the legacy void whenever
9. Doe dent. Hindson v. Kersey, 4 Bums Eccl. Law 27 (1765), reprinted in 1 Day
41, 58 (Conn. 1802).
10. 25 GEO. II, c. 6 (1752), amended by 7 Wit. IV and Vicr., c. 26, §§ 14-17 (1837);
see Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. Rxv. 1, 22 et seq. (digest of the
thirty-seven American gift purging statutes). These statutes will hereinafter be termed
"purging statutes."
11. Such a problem might arise where a will was witnessed by a person whose inter-
est under it was not killed by the purging statute. See Smith v. Goodell, 23 11. 145,
101 N. E. 255 (1913) (pecuniary interest of partner of executor attestor); see note 22
infra.
12. Disinterest in fact could only occur where the interested attester had knowledge
of the purging statute at the time of attestation. Generally his attestation itself belies
such knowledge.
13. See ATKiNSON, W VLS (1937) 262; 1 WoEnRxE, AumiducA. L.kw op ADmn is-
TRAT oN (3d ed. 1923) 104.
14. Patanska v. Kuznia, 102 N. J. Eq. 408, 141 Atl. 88 (Ch. 1928), off'd, 104 N. J.
Eq. 202, 203, 204, 145 Ati. 921, 922 (1929) (legacy of superfluous witness held void).
15. "Legatee" throughout this note will refer both to those who take devises of realty
and to those who take bequests of personalty under a will.
16. Co . GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4877. Twenty-two states have similar statutes. See
Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 24.
17. Ky. STAT. A-NN. (Carroll, 1936) § 4836; Miss. CoDn ANN. (1930) § 3554; TEX.
ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1926) art. 8296; W. VA. CODE Auu. (Michie & Sub-
lett, 1937) § 4049.
18. See note 16 supra.
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the validity of a will required proof that the legatee in question was an essen-
tial attesting witness.19 Other courts construe the statute as invalidating the
gift only if the attesting legatee's testimony is necessary to successful probate
of the will.20 Since in these latter jurisdictions a will may often be probated
on the production of one attesting witness, 21 the second interpretation voids
fewer gifts than the first. Both interpretations are equally reasonable on a
verbal level. The compelling nature of either, however, is interrelated with
the more fundamental problem of whether a legatee is "incompetent," because
of interest, to attest a will. This is, pf course, the underlying problem in the
early probate-attestation controversy. For example, a requirement of two
disinterested witnesses at attestation in a jurisdiction with the probate view
of the purging statute would produce an incongruous result. The purging
statute in such a case, applying only where a legatee testifies, would not
operate where a non-testifying legatee was one of the required attesting wit-
nesses; the entire will in such a case would be void.2 2 Recognizing this inter-
relation between the requirements of competency to attest and the alternative
interpretations of the purging statutes, courts in one state, as a result of a
gift purging statute which, they held, voided gifts only when the attesting
legatee testified, have denied the necessity of two disinterested witnesses at
the time of attestation.23
In judging the correctness of these two alternative interpretations of the
statutes, consideration must be given to the extent of the different evils at
which each interpretation aims. The probate view, formulated to prevent
possible gains by an attesting legatee from perjury on the witness stand, has
become somewhat of an anomaly since witnesses in other suits normally need
not be disinterested.2 4 On the other hand, the toll of the attestation view in
19. Swanzy v. Kolb, 46 So. 549 (Miss. 1908); Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393
(1881); Bruce v. Shuler, 108 Va. 670, 62 S. E. 973 (1908) (decided under a purging
statute since repealed).
20. Doyle v. Brady, 170 Ky. 316, 185 S. W. 1133 (1916) ; Davis v. Davis, 43 W. Va.
300, 27 S. E. 323 (1897). In some cases the gift is not purged even where a legatee-
attestor has given testimony when this was unnecessary to probate of the will. Cornwell
v. Wooley, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 441 (N. Y. 1867); Calvert v. Calvert, 208 Ky. 760, 271
S. W. 1082 (1925). Analyzed from the standpoint of competency rather than from the
time of the statute's operation, the probate interpretation makes an attesting legatee
competent to testify, while the attestation view makes him competent to attest.
21. This result may follow because only one witness is required to be produced, or
because, although two are required to be produced if available, one of them is unavail-
able. See Cornwell v. Wooley, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 441, 443 (N. Y. 1867) ; Davis v. Davis,
43 W. Va. 300, 302, 27 S. E. 323, 324 (1897) ; N. Y. SuRR. CT. Acr §§ 141, 142.
22. See Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393, 398 (1881). A somewhat analogous
invalidation of a will occurred under Illinois law because the purging statute could not
purge the legacy of a necessary attesting witness. The will was witnessed by a partner
of the executors and trustees under the will. Smith v. Goodell, 258 Ill. 145, 101 N, E.
255 (1913). Compare, however, a subsequent case in which a will witnessed by a di-
rector and stockholder of a corporate executor was sustained, but the executor was barred
by the purging statute from acting. Olson v. Larson, 320 111. 50, 150 N. E. 337 (1925).
23. Davis v. Davis, 43 W. Va. 300, 301, 27 S. E. 323, 324 (1897).
24. General disqualification of witnesses for interest has been removed by statute.
Ky. CoDus ANN. (Carroll, 1938) Civ. Prac. § 605; Nav YORK Civ. PRAc. AcT § 346;
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gifts invalidated irrespective of merit is much greater than that of the probate
view. Since under the attestation interpretation, which causes the greater
interference with testatorial intent, the statute removes possible gain from
fraud or undue influence at the execution of a will, a choice of interpretations,
as under the earlier probate-attestation controversy, hinges in large measure
on the degree of undue influence and fraud which disinterested attestation
could prevent. 25
Such evaluation of the attestation view has been made necessary by a recent
New York decision.26 By its terms the purging statute in New York voids
a gift to an attesting legatee only when the will may not be proved without
his testimony ;27 and no gift heretofore has been invalidated solely because
a legatee had attested a will.28 In the instant case, however, the Surrogate
X. VA. CODE Aim. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 5726; see 2 \xVIiono, EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1940) § 577. An exception to these enabling acts has remained in most states under stat-
utes which render a witness incompetent to testify on his own behalf against the deced-
ent's estate as to any transaction with a decedent. See 2 WxMoRE, EV1DFZ;cz (3d ed.
1940) § 578. By the majority rule such statutes do not disqualify a legatee from testifying
in his own behalf at the probate of the will under which he takes. Snider v. Burks, 84 Ala.
53, 4 So. 225 (1M8) ; Martin v. McAdams, 87 Tex. 225, 27 S. AV. 255 (1894) ; In re
Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417, 60 P. (2d) 41 (1936); see ATziso:, Wu.s (1937)
265. In New York, however, no legatee can testify at probate on his own behalf even as
to conversations between testators and tldrd parties. N. Y. CODE OF CvIL Proc. (Rust,
1886) § 829; Matter of Eysaman, 113 N. Y. 62, 20 N. E. 613 (189); Matter of Dun-
ham, 121 N. Y. 575, 24 N. E. 932 (1890). But cf. Matter of Kindberg, 207 N. Y. 220,
226, 100 N. E. 789, 790 (1912). § 829 has been reenacted, with no changes affecting this
problem, in N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1935) § 347. The New York rule, which purges an
attesting legatee's gift in order that he may testify, is less of an anomaly than the rule in
Kentucky, where every legatee but an attesting legatee can testify without regard to his
interest under the will. Caddell v. Caddell, 175 Ky. 505, 510, 194 S. W. 541, 543 (1917).
25. Aside from the similarity of the equitable considerations upon which both probate-
attestation controversies are based, the probate view in the early controversy differs in
its legal results from the time-of-probate test under the purging statute in question.
The former view, arising directly out of the will execution statute, always required
two witnesses even though their competency was measured by their ability to testify
at probate. Today the early probate viewpoint would, under the enabling acts, clearly
put an end to any disqualification for interest. See note 24 supra. On the other hand,
the later probate view arises under purging statutes which kill gifts despite the enabling
acts; it has no reference to whether the attesting legatee's signature is needed to prove
a valid execution of the will but only to whether he testified to prove the will. See
Caw v. Robertson, 5 N. Y. 125, 131 (1851).
26. Matter of Walters, 172 Misc. 207, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 8 (Surr. Ct. 1939), affd
without opinion, 259 App. Div. 1078, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 37 (2d Dep't 1940) (dissent
by Taylor, J.).
27. N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 27.
28. Cav v. Robertson, 5 N. Y. 125 (1851) (gift to one of three attesting witnesses
was valid only because he did not testify in proving the will; the fact that only two
witnesses need attest a will was not considered in determining whether to purge his
gift); Cornwell v. Wooley, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 441 (N. Y. 1867) (although a non-resident,
one of two attesting legatees, testified to prove a will, the will could, according to statute,
have been otherwise proved without his testimony as a non-resident; his gift was, there-
fore, sustained) ; Matter of Owen, 48 App. Div. 507, 62 N. Y. S. 919 (2d Dep't 1900)
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indicated that the statute may be more broadly construed. An attesting legatee
had purposely left the state to avoid testifying at the probate of a will. Upon
proof that she could not be found within the state, the Surrogate issued an
order dispensing with her testimony and subsequently admitted the will to
probate. At the time of distribution, however, the attesting legatee made her
appearance demanding her share of the decedent's estate. Though there was
no question that the will had been honestly executed, was fair, and had been
"proved without the testimony" of the legatee, the Surrogate voided the gift.
Preoccupied with the moral shortcomings of the attesting legatee,20 the Sur-
rogate's opinion does not state clearly whether the statute required invalida-
tion of the gift without reference to whether the legatee had testified"0 or
whether the legatee was precluded from claiming under the will on some
equitable ground of estoppel because of her failure to testify at probate. In
either case, however, this opinion opens the door in New York to voiding
gifts under a will because the recipient is an attesting witness rather than
because he testified at probate. The wisdom of such a move must be judged,
therefore, not only in the light of the legatee's moral integrity, but by the neces-
sity of changing New York law to secure disinterest at time of attestation. 1
The force behind the requirement for disinterested attesting witnesses has
come from an assumption that testators are infirm men "whose hands have
survived their heads,"3 2 easy victims of fraud and undue influence. The
(testimony of third attesting witness stricken as unnecessary; his gift not purged);
Matter of Tactkian, 109 Misc. 519, 179 N. Y. S. 188 (Surr. Ct. 1919); Morse v.
Tilden, 35 Misc. 560, 72 N. Y. S. 30 (Surr. Ct. 1901), mod. on other grounds, 74 App.
Div. 132, 77 N. Y. S. 505 (1st Dep't 1902). Every case in New York concerning the
"competency" of legatees appears to have been decided under the purging statutes; and
the courts have never determined expressly whether a legatee is a competent atlesting
witness [See Note (1940) 53 HAuv. L. REv. 858, 861], although the opportunity to
determine this issue separately from whether a gift should be purged has arisen both
on settling an administrator's accounts, as in Cornwell v. Wooley, supra, and on the
attempted proof of a will. Matter of Beck, 6 App. Div. 211, 39 N. Y. Supp. 810 (2d Dep't
1896), aff'd, 154 N. Y. 750, 49 N. E. 1093 (1897).
29. The Surrogate held that, in view of the purging statute which made the attesting
legatee "compellable to testify" after purging his gift, the legatee was a "wrongdoer."
Matter of Walters, 172 Misc. 207, 214, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 8, 15 (Surr. Ct. 1939). This
argument, however, assumes its conclusion since the legatee is only "compellable to
testify" when the purging statute is called into operation; but the statute's application to
the legatee's gift is the problem in issue.
30. At one point the Surrogate appears to accept this view in saying "I do not
think the meaning and intent of Sec. 27 of the Decendent Estate Law . . . can be
taken as referring to the theory of proving a will . . ." Matter of Walters, 172 Misc.
207, 214, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 8, 16 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
31. Three other states have purging statutes similar to New York in explicitly
conditioning their operation on an attesting legatee's testimony; but the problems arising
under the New York law have yet to be litigated in those states. ARiz. CODE ANN.
(1940) § 41-110; Anx. DiG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 14547, Rockafellow v. Rockafellow,
192 Ark. 563, 93 S.W. (2d) 321 (1936) semble; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937)
§ 10504-19.
32. Doe dem. Hindson v. Kersey, 4 Burns Eccl. Law 27 (1765), reprinted in 1 Day
41, 57 (Conn. 1802) (Lord Camden's dissent).
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theory of the infirm testator is, however, of doubtful significance today.
Though statistics are unavailable, it is a safe generalization that most modern
wills are drawn by testators in the prime of life acting in consultation with
counsel. With a more general realization of the importance of careful dis-
position of estates, the death-bed will has in large measure passed into legal
oblivion. Even where wills are made by the infirm, however, the possibility
of fraud is largely chimerical. Only in an imaginative flight of fancy does
a legatee by sleight of hand substitute a bogus will for a true one; the methods
of forgery are much more available to one bent on fraud.
This possibility of undue influence in the legatee-attested will of an infirm
testator alone affords an equitable basis for a rule which would void all
attesting legatees' bequests. Admittedly such a rule will have some practical
prophylactic effect. On the other hand, since friends and close relatives of
a legatee qualify as "disinterested witnesses, ' 'a3 the practical protection against
undue influence afforded the testator may be slight. Furthermore, where
the choice of legal rules lies between statutory interpretations alternatively
purging legatee's gifts upon attestation or upon testimony, rather than between
the presence or absence of a general requirement of disinterest at attestation,
there will be a similar practical preventative effect under both rules. The
uncertain but possible purging of an attesting legatee under the testimony
rule will insure "disinterested witnesses" in most lawyer-dram wills as
effectively as the certain voiding of all gifts under the attestation rule. Aside
from its dubious advantages over the probate view, however, the ounce of
prevention in the attestation interpretation of the purging statute may cost
more than its correlative pound of cure; although less severe in operation
than the early time-of-attestation theory because by statute the residue of
the will is saved, this interpretation, nonetheless, partially nullifies the exercise
of testatorial powers more frequently than does the probate interpretation.
If interest were entirely abolished as a disqualifying factor at probate
as well as at attestation, undue influence could be combatted by raising a
rebuttable presumption of undue influence against the proponents of a YAil
when suspicious circumstances surround its execution. While the mere
presence of beneficiaries at the execution of a will has never raised a pre-
sumption of undue influence,34 the exclusive presence of people interested
for themselves or friends has.35 Furthermore, conjunctions of such circum-
33. Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 92 Mass. 155 (1865) (legatee was attesting witness'
son). In some jurisdictions one spouse is a competent attesting witness to a will under
which the other takes. In re Holt's Vill, 56 Minn. 33, 57 N. NV. 219 (1893). These
holdings sometimes coexist with the requirement of disinterested witnesses to execution
of a will. Compare Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Te. 643, 30 S. NV. 861 (1895) (wife a
competent attesting witness), with Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393 (1881). Cases contra
appear to be based on disability of spouses to testify for each other generally. Belledin
v. Gooley, 157 Ind. 49, 60 N. E. 706 (1901) ; see A'rxNsox, NVrra.s (1937) 269. This
disability is not extended to other relatives.
34. Henry v. Hall, 106 Ala. 84, 96, 17 So. 187, 191 (1895); Ethridge v. Bennett,
9 Houst. 295, 304, 31 At. 813, 816 (Del. 1891).
35. Children's Aid Society v. Loveridge, 70 N. Y. 387 (1877) (presumption satis-
factorily rebutted).
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stances as the infirmity of the testator, a close relation between the testator
and the chief beneficiary, an inequitable will, and the drawing of a will by
the beneficiary, have been held to raise such a presumption.3 6 An attesting
witness could be denied the rewards of an attempt to use undue influence
by raising such a presumption whenever a legatee attested a will of whose
contents he was aware, or where such attestation is combined either with an
unfair disposition or with infirmity of the testator.3 7 If such a check on undue
influence has any defects per se, it is in the cost and time of contesting wills
which would be unattacked except for the presumption.
In many jurisdictions the necessity of at least technical disinterest in an
attesting witness may be too firmly imbedded in the law to be changed. Where,
however, the desirability of this requirement is still open to debate, a re-
analysis of the practical effect of interested attestation should be undertaken.
Neither the fear of undue influence and fraud, which such a requirement
might allay, nor the crude way in which the doctrine operates under the
purging statutes, can support its extension. Even where undue inflience by
an interested attesting witness constitutes actual danger, it may be checked
by the use of presumptions of undue influence against the witness in proving
the will; or, if so great a change in established law is undesirable, much of
the practical effect of the attestation test may be achieved with less inequity
under the time-of-probate view of disinterest. The principal case, which has
the effect of voiding a legatee's interest in a will to which she was an attesting
witness but which was proved without her testimony, represents an undesirable
trend away from established New York doctrine, especially insofar as the
decision is not clearly limited to cases where a legatee's action is morally
reprehensible.
SCOPE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL RULES*
THE Federal Rules1 greatly broaden a litigant's opportunities to obtain
information from his opponent before trial.2 Yet courts schooled in the
36. Wunderlich v. Buerger, 287 Ill. 440, 122 N. E. 827 (1919) (drawing of the
will by beneficiary) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 66 Pa. St. 283 (1870) (drawing of will by bene-
ficiary in close relation but not object of natural bounty of infirm testator) ; see Phillips'
Estate, 244 Pa. St. 35, 44, 90 AtI. 457, 460 (1914). Where the beneficiary is a spouse
of a testator, presumptions are less frequently applied. See ATKINSON, WILLS (1937)
517; 1 PAGE, WILuS (2d ed. 1926) § 724.
37. The strength of these presumptions may vary greatly, from supporting inferences
of undue influence in order to uphold a jury verdict to supporting jury instructions
casting on proponents the burden of rebutting the presumption. See ATIuxsoN, WILLS
(1937) 519; 1 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 721.
* Mackerer v. New York Cent. R. R., 1 F. R. D. 408 (E. D. N. Y. 1940).
1. 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723c (Supp. 1940).
2. For a statement of former restrictions and the effect the new rules were intended
to have upon them, see 2 MooRE, FED~aEAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL RuLEs
(1938) §§ 26.02, 33.02, 34.02, and authorities cited therein. It is the purpose of this Note
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old federal discovery practice3 or in narrow state discovery provisions4 have
failed to give full scope to the intent of the new procedure. The result has
been a mass of conflicting opinions on the present scope of discovery in the
federal courts.5
The discoverability of the particular matter requested cannot be consid-
ered until it is determined that the moving party has the right to make use of
discovery procedure. This right, often unquestioned, becomes an issue when
plaintiff is without knowledge of sufficient facts to support his pleaded cause
of action.0 Under the rules, plaintiffs acting solely on suspicion or for nui-
sance purposes may easily frame a complaint. 7 While discovery procedure
dearly should not be made available to such plaintiffs, it should not be denied
those with bona fide claims who find their opponents in possession of the
facts necessary to establish their causes of action. The difficulty of protect-
ing both innocent defendants and bona fide plaintiffs has long been recog-
nized by the courts, but their discussions of the problem merely serve to em-
phasize that no test can be devised by which plaintiff's integrity may be
proved. s Each case must be left to the discretion of the court, which under
the Rules may call pre-trial hearings to assist it in its determination. A def-
inite showing that plaintiff has no reasonable grounds for believing a cause
of action exists should be required, however, before use of discovery pro-
cedure is refused. The liberal spirit of the Rules strongly discourages denial
of relief because of "nuisance value" or "fishing expedition" accusations.
Furthermore, courts should be less willing to accentuate the inconvenience
occasioned defendants in federal actions, which invariably involve large
sums, than in state actions, where the claim may be comparatively petty.
Courts which have decided the question have, in fact, generally done so in
favor of the plaintiff.' 0
The right to discovery may again be questioned if it appears that the party
is attempting to confine his preparation to an investigation of his more dili-
gent adversary's work.': While discovery procedure should not be made avail-
to discuss only the operation of Rules 26, 33, and 34, relating to discovery by deposition,
written interrogatories, and production of documents.
3. For examples of this influence, see Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215
(W. D. Mo. 1940), and Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp.
936 (V. D. Mto. 1939).
4. See Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 453, 454 (E. D. Wis. 1940).
5. Undoubtedly, a further important element in the conflict, which cannot be dis-
covered in the reports, has been the varying impressions which individual cases have
made upon the courts.
6. C. F. Simonon's Sons v. American Can Co., 30 F. Supp. 901 (E. D. Pa. 1939);
Varey v. Gaunt, 1 F. R- D. 204 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); United States v. Doudera, 28 F.
Supp. 223 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
7. A complaint is confined to a short and concise statement of the claim; no facts
should be pleaded. See Rule 8 and Appendix of Forms.
8. C. F. Simonon's Sons v. American Can Co., 30 F. Supp. 901 (E. D. Pa. 1939);
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U. S. 6S9 (1933).
9. See Rule 16.
10. See note 6 .rpra.
11. Piorkowski v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 1 F. R. D. 407 (M. D. Pa. 1940);
Compagnie Continentale D'Importation v. Pacific Argentine Brazil Line, 1 F. R. D.
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able as an instrument for purloining an opponent's preparation, it is difficult
to distinguish this situation from reasonable requests to discover before trial
the grounds on which an opponent's claims are based. A rough test may be
devised, however, on the basis of the availability to the moving party of the
facts sought to be discovered. 12 If the court is satisfied that he is unable to
obtain the information elsewhere, his opponent should be required to make
it available to him.
When the moving party has access to the information from sources other
than his opponent, either of two solutions may be adopted. The court may
simply -refuse the request and advise the moving party to go to those other
sources; or it may grant the moving party's request, but require him to remit
to his opponent the expenses incurred in obtaining the information, plus a
reasonable fee for services. While the first method is a certain solution of
the basic problem, it nevertheless doubles the effort and expense necessary
to make the information available to both parties. In addition, parties erro-
neously determined to have independent access to the requested information
would be precluded from obtaining it, and thereby made subject to surprise
attack on trial. The second method eliminates these defects, but by allowing
litigants of limited initiative and unlimited capital to purchase their prepara-
tion from their opponents, sometimes fails to solve the basic problem. Prob-
ably it is this consideration which has thus far led the courts to employ the
first method.' 3
The right to the use of discovery procedure established, the problem be-
comes one of determining whether the particular request falls within the lim-
its of discovery as defined by the Rules. A recent case indicates the type of
question that may arise.14 Plaintiff alleged that intestate's death was caused
by the overturning of defendant's steam crane, and demanded production of
all papers and records showing repairs made to the crane subsequent to the
accident. Since any such documents would be inadmissible as part of the
plaintiff's case at trial,' 5 defendant resisted production, contending that such
matters were beyond the scope of discovery as defined by Rules 26 and 34.
388 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Schweinert v. Insurance Co. of North America, 1 F. R. D. 247
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Creden v. Central R. R. of N. J., 1 F. R. D. 168 (E. D. N. Y.
1940); United States v. American Solvents & Chem. Corp. of Calif., 30 F. Supp. 107
(D. Del. 1939); McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
12. Extreme care should be taken to avoid pushing an availability test into the old
restriction disallowing inquiries into matters as much within the knowledge of the in-
terrogating party as of the adverse party. See Kingsway Press v. Farrell Pub. Co., 30 F.
Supp. 775, 776 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 33.02, Where the
purpose of the inquiry is to obtain admissions, restrict issues, etc., the test should not be
applied; it should be used only when the evident purpose is to obtain information, and
the circumstances are suspicious.
13. Piorkowski v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 1 F. R. D. 407 (M. D. Pa. 1940); Com-
pagnie Continentale D'Importation v. Pacific Argentine Brazil Line, I F. R. D. 388
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Schweinert v. Insurance Co. of North America, 1 F. R. D. 247
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Creden v. Central R. R. of N. J., 1 F. R. D. 168 (E. D. N. Y.
1940); McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
14. Mackerer v. New York Cent. R. R., 1 F. R. D. 408 (E. D. N. Y. 1940).
15. Columbia & Puget Sound R. R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202 (1892).
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The court allowed plaintiff's request on the ground that the limit of discov-
ery was not admissibility of documents, but their relevance or reasonably
probable materiality. The decision necessarily implies that Rules 26 and 34
are to be construed together and assigned the same limits.
Rule 34 permits discovery of those documents which "constitute or con-
tain evidence material to any matter involved in the action." l6 Rule 26 per-
mits questions on oral examination or in written interrogatories which are
in regard to "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved in the pending action." 17 Judicial opinion varies widely, not only
as to whether Rules 26 and 34 set identical limits of discovery, but also as to
what matters fall within their limits, be they respective or identical.
Since to require the demander to prove the materiality of the requested
documents would require him to know their contents before he had seen
them,' 8 "evidence material to any matter" has almost universally been held
to permit production of documents of "reasonably probable materiality." 20
The unanimity of opinion on Rule 34 ceases there. One interpretation of
"reasonably probable materiality," regarding Rule 34 as more limited in scope
than Rule 26, identifies materiality with admissibility in evidence.20 Produc-
16. Rule 34 provides: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor . . .
the court . . may order any party to produce . . . any designated documents . . . not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in his possession, custody or control."
17. Rule 26(a) provides: "The testimony of any person . . . may be taken at the
instance of any party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for
the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes." Rule
26(b) provides: "The deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . including the
existence, description, (and) nature . . . of any . . . documents . . ." Rule 33 pro-
vides: "Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be an-
swered by the party served . . ." The wording of Rule 26(a) to include both oral ex-
amination and written interrogatories, and the failure of Rule 33 to define the permis-
sible scope of the interrogatories, have led to universal agreement that the two rules are
to be construed in pari nateria and assigned the same scope. Kingsway Press v. Farrell
Pub. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 775 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Coca-Cola Co. v. Dilxi-Cola Labora-
tories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939); Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 903 (D.
Mass. 1938) ; see 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.02.
18. Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 936 (W. D.
Mo. 1939) ; Beler v. Savarona Ship Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
19. Fishmnan v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 460 (E. D. Pa. 1940) ; Bruun v. Hanson, 30 F.
Supp. 602 (D. Idaho 1939); United States ;. Aluminum Corp. of America, 1 F. R. D.
57 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 26 F. Supp. 711
(S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Beler v. Savarona Ship. Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
But see Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 936, 937 (W. D.
Mo. 1939); Thomas French & Sons, Ltd. v. Carleton Venetian Blind Co., 30 F. Supp.
903, 905 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
20. Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (IV. D. Mo. 1940); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F. R. D. 62 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Sonken-Galamba Corp.
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 936 (W. D. Mo. 1939); Kenealy v. Texas Co.,
29 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation
(1940) 7 U. oF Cm. L. Rav. 297, 313-315.
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tion is permitted of documents which might be admissible in evidence, but
denied as to those of known inadmissibility. This construction refuses pro-
duction not only of documents valuable solely because they might furnish clues
whereby evidence could be obtained, but also of those admissible only for
purposes of cross examination or rebuttal. 21 The more liberal view of the
principal case, identifying Rule 34 with Rule 26, permits production of all
documents containing relevant matter.22 Documents valuable only for pur-
poses of cross-examination, rebuttal, or clue-finding are generally considered
relevant.
23
The absurdity of determining the right to procedural relief by attempting
to distinguish between "probable materiality" and "relevancy" indicates the
advisability of a liberal construction. 24 The intent of the Rules is to remove
hampering restrictions and fine distinctions, and to extend discovery to all
matters furnishing useful information. Furthermore, the admissibility test
is so concerned with the word "material" that it fails to give to the phrase
immediately following it, "to any matter involved in the action," the signifi-
cance to which it is entitled. The validity and probative value of evidence
are matters involved in the action, and documents valuable for cross-examina-
tion or rebuttal are indispensable in developing the true facts of the case. Like-
wise, the phrase can be held to include documents which may lead to admis-
sible evidence, since obtaining evidence may be considered a matter involved
in the action. Since the administration of substantial justice in any given case
may well depend on the development of evidence from clues found in inadmis-
sible documents, such a construction appears supportable.
The reluctance of some courts to regard "probable materiality" as co-
extensive with "relevancy" gives the impression that relevancy is virtually
unbounded. Such is not the case, however, for although admissibility in evi-
dence is not the test of relevancy, discovery of some matters is frequently
denied for no other apparent reason.2 5 Courts have repeatedly refused, on
the ground of irrelevancy, to require answers calling for either the expression
21. See note 20 supra.
22. Compagnie Continentale D'Importation v. Pacific Argentine Brazil Line, 1 F.
R. D. 388 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 1 F. R. D. 190 (D. Conn. 1940); Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Okla.
1939); Florindin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 26 F. Supp. 968 (D. Del. 1939).
23. Creden v. Central R. R. of N. J., 1 F. R. D. 168 (E. D. N. Y. 1940) (rebuttal);
Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Okla. 1939) (develop useful information) ; Bough
v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (cross-examination); Lewis v. United Air
Lines Transport Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1939) (develop useful information);
Florindin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 26 F. Supp. 968 (D. Del. 1939) (necessary to
full understanding); see Lynch v. Pollak, 1 F. R. D. 120, 121 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (cross-
examination).
24. See Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F. R. D. 190,
192 (D. Conn. 1940).
25. If admissibility is taken as a test of relevance, Rule 26(a), stating that "testi-
mony may be taken for purposes of discovery, or for use as evidence, or for both pur-
poses," is rewritten to read, "testimony may be taken for use as evidence, or both for
discovery purposes and for use as evidence, but not for discovery purposes alone."
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of opinion 2 6 or the revelation of hearsay.2 7 Just why these matters are irrele-
vant to the subject matter of the action is not clear; no court declaring them
so has seen fit to explain its reasoning.
By contrast, the few cases in which these claims have been allowed furnish
cogent arguments in favor of the relevance of both opinion and hearsay. -
An opponent's opinion frequently will limit testimony and restrict issues at
trial: an end which the Rules seek to achieve. Furthermore, both opinion
and hearsay often furnish useful information by which evidence theretofore
unknown to the moving party is brought to his attention.20
This construction of the discovery Rules is not so broad as to subject parties
to undue oppression and annoyance, if the court is careful in determining the
right to discovery procedure in the first place. If, after the establishment of
that right, any particular request is considered peculiarly oppressive, the court
has ample power to limit it.30 Moreover, since the information obtained will
not be admissible in evidence, no unjustifiable harm can come to the adverse
party through granting discovery of all relevant matters. If the information
leads to the development of evidence which will cost the party furnishing it
his case, that is but the "substantial justice" which the discovery Rules seek
to insure.
26. This is particularly notable in patent suits wherein one party asks, in effect, in
what way he is infringing on the other's patent. Schoenman v. Brauer, 1 F. R. D. 292
(W. D. Mo. 1940); Nakken Patents Corp. v. Rabinowitz, 1 F. R. D. 90 (E. D. N. Y.
1940); Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 453 (E. D. Wis. 1940); Stanley
Works v. C. S. 'Mersick & Co., 1 F. R. D. 43 (D. Conn. 1939); E. I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co. v. Byrnes, 1 F. R_ D. 34 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Thomas French & Sons Y.
Carleton Venetian Blind Co., 30 F. Supp. 903 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Boysell Co. v. Hale,
30 F. Supp. 255 (E. D. Tenn. 1939); Lanova Corp. v. National Supply Co., 29 F. Supp.
119 (W. D. Pa. 1939); Teller v. Montgomery-Ward & Co., 27 F. Supp. 933 (E D.
Pa. 1939); Babcox & Wilcox v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 25 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del.
1938). But see Pike & Willis, supra note 20, at 312.
Requests in personal injury suits as to what acts of a person constituted (contribu-
tory) negligence have met with the same treatment. Tudor v. Leslie, 4 F. R. S. 33.324,
Case 1 (D. Mass. 1940); Doucette v. Eastern States Transp. Co., 1 F. R. D. 66 (D.
Mass. 1939); Doucette v. Howe, 1 F. R. D. 18 (D. Mass. 1939).
27. Maryland v. Pan-American'Bus Lines, 1 F. R. D. 213 (D. Md. 1940); Auer v.
Hershey Creamery Co., 1 F. R. D. 14 (D. N. J. 1939); Rose Silk Mills v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 29 F. Supp. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp.
164 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
28. Kulich v. Murray, 23 F. Supp. 675 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Schwartz v. Howard
Hosiery Co., 27 F. Supp. 443 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Florindin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co.,
26 F. Supp. 968 (D. Del. 1939); Pierce v. Submarine Signal Co., 25 F. Supp. 862 (D.
Mass. 1939).
29. See Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Conn.
1939): "To the extent that the examination develops useful information it functions
successfully as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces no testimony directly ad-
missible."
30. See Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F. R. D. 190,
192 (D. Conn. 1940); Rule 30(b).
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REPARATIONS TO SHIPPERS UNDER THE ARIZONA GROCERY CASE*
NINE years ago, in the Arizona Grocery case,' the Supreme Court denied
the statutory power 2 of the Interstate Commerce Commission to award repar-
ations 3 on shipments made under a rate which the Commission had prescribed
as a reasonable maximum for the future. The opinion emphasized the dual
character of Commission activity, asserting that the function of prescribing
rates was quasi-legislative in nature and not quasi-judicial. Hence all com-
mission-made rates, as distinct from carrier-made rates, were analogized to
statutes and held not to be subject to retroactive modification by subsequent
reparation orders.
The Court, in disposing of the case on the abstract distinction between
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers, gave no consideration to possible
differences arising from the four-fold aspect of ICC rate-making power-
authorizing it to prescribe either a maximum rate, maximum and minimum
rates, a specific rate, or a minimum rate. Where the Commission has pre-
scribed a maximum rate, as in the Arizona situation, the carrier may fix
its rate below the established ceiling. A similar situation is encountered
within narrower limits where the Commission order has prescribed both
maximum and minimum rates. In both of these cases the effect of the
Arizona decision is to remove the carriers' incentive to reduce rates where
the maximum has been unreasonably high and to place the burden of obtain-
ing a downward revision upon the shipper. A Commission order under such
circumstances should not justify the assumption that setting a rate within
the prescribed limit will automatically immunize the carrier from subsequent
reparation awards. The common law burden of maintaining a reasonable
rate within the prescribed limits might well have been left with the carriers.4
Greater justification for the Arizona rule can be found where the rate charged
by the carriers is a specific rate or a minimum rate prescribed by the Coin-
* City of Danville v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 34 F. Supp. 620 (W. D. Va. 1940).
1. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S. 370 (1932), 41 YALE
L. J. 625. The case arose in the federal courts on a bill to enforce an ICC reparation
order. In 1921 the ICC had found that the existing rate on sugar moving from Califor-
nia points to Phoenix had been, then was, and would be unreasonable to the extent that
it exceeded 96.5 cents per hundred pounds. Pursuant to this order, the carriers had es-
tablished a rate of 96 cents and subsequently made a voluntary reduction to 84 cents. In
1925 shippers again assailed the rate as unreasonable. In this proceeding the Commission,
acting upon substantially the same facts, prescribed for the future a maximum reasonable
rate of 71 cents. Subsequently, in a reparation proceeding, the ICC found that the rate
had been unreasonable since 1922 and awarded reparations on a basis of 73 cents front
Northern California and 71 cents from Southern California points. The Supreme Court
set aside the reparation order, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissenting.
2. The Supreme Court has indicated that the question presented in the Arisona
case was solely one of statutory construction. No constitutional issue was involved. See
Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refg Co., 287 U. S. 358, 362 (1932).
3. The ICC's authority to award reparations is found in § 16(1) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 36 STAT. 554 (1910), 49 U. S. C. § 16(1) (1935).
4. Where the maximum rate prescribed appears too low, the carrier may seek pro-
tection by attacking the rate as confiscatory in the courts.
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mission. The carriers may not deviate below the established tariff without
incurring penalty.5 But apparently even here no constitutional objection can
be raised to prevent retroactive adjustment by reparation awards if prescribed
rates are made provisional either in express statutory terms or by judicial
construction.6
In distinguishing all commission-made rates, regardless of type, from car-
rier-made rates, the Court in the Arizona case sought to lay down a broad
principle of statutory construction to guide the ICC in handling reparation
awards. But the distinction has not easily been fitted to Commission pro-
cedure. Consequently, a precise defining of this jurisdictional barrier to
reparation awards has occupied no small part of Commission proceedings
during the past nine years.
The problem confronting Commission and courts in applying the tenuous
distinction between Commission-made and carrier-made rates is illustrated
in a recent decision.7 In 1915 the Commission prescribed a rate of $22.10
per ton on bituminous coal in carloads from mines in Virginia and West
Virginia to Danville, Virginia. In 1917 the Commission authorized a general
increase of 15 per cent on coal rates in the Southern territory and the carriers
raised the rate to $2.20 per ton. Under the sanction of further general in-
crease orders in 1918 and 1920, the Danville rate was fixed at $3.60 per ton.
Commission proceedings in 1922 resulted in a general reduction order which
lowered the rate to $3.09, and a further reduction to $2.89 per ton was
voluntarily made by the carriers in 1925. The rate stood at that figure until
assailed as unreasonable in the instant proceedings. The Commission found
the rate unreasonable to the extent that it exceeded $2.55 per ton and awarded
reparations on that basis. The carriers contested the power of the Com-
mission to enter the reparation order, contending primarily that the assailed
rate had at all times been maintained under the sanction of Commission orders
except when voluntarily reduced in 1925, and therefore fell within the ambit
of the Arizona rule. Although terming this defense the most significant
offered by the carriers, the Court rejected it and held that specific rates
altered in accordance with general increase and reduction orders of the ICC
are not Commission-made.8
5. 34 STAT. 591 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 16(8) (1935).
6. See Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Rerg Co., 287 U. S. 358, 363 (1932). The
advantages of a flexible rate-making procedure of this type are discussed in the authori-
ties cited infra note 24.
7. City of Danville v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 34 F. Supp. 620 (W. D. Va. 1940).
8. In reaching this result the court followed the view asserted in Eagle Cotton Oil
Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), cert. dcnicd, 284 U. S. 675
(1931); cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Louisiana Oil Ref'g Co., 76 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. Sth,
1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 767 (1935). Doubt seems to have been cast upon the hold-
ing in the Eagle Cotton Oil case immediately following the Arizona decision. On sub-
stantially similar facts, the Commission denied an award of reparations, holding the
Arizona case applicable. Coal Trade Ass'n v. Baltimore & 0. R. RL, 185 I. C. C. 225
(1932). But, on reconsideration of the case, this view was rejected. 190 I. C. C. 743
(1933); cf. State Corp. Comm. of Va. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 190 I. C. C. 325 (1932).
In recent proceedings authorizing blanket increases in rates the ICC has expressly stated
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While the argument proposed by the carriers is doctrinally plausible, the
holding that rates established pursuant to general increase and reduction
orders are not commission-made is sounder in terms of ICC procedure.
General increases and reductions on a nationwide scale are authorized by the
Commission as emergency measures to harmonize transportation costs and
revenues with general economic conditions. The courts hive recognized that
the Commission need not, in approving a proposed general increase, consider
the reasonableness of each of the thousands of individual rates involved.0
The length of time required to make such an investigation would render
Commission action wholly ineffective. In addition, the courts have held that
the proper remedy for shippers who believe that general increases in specific
rates will work to their disadvantage is not a bill seeking to enjoin the blanket
increase order but an action before the Commission attacking the specific rate
as unreasonable. 10 Moreover, an opposite holding would soon bring all rates
within the Commission-made category and successfully prevent further repar-
ation awards.
The principal case illustrates only one of several typical situations in which
the carriers have attempted to extend the scope of the Arizona rule. Argu-
ment has been made that a finding in a prior proceeding to the effect that
assailed rates established by the carriers "were not unreasonable in the past""1
or "are not unreasonable," without entry of an order prescribing rates for
the future, places the Commission's stamp of approval on the rates in question
and precludes subsequent attack for reparation purposes. 12 This argument
that the Arizona case does not preclude subsequent reparation awards if specific rates
are proved unreasonable. See Express Rates, 231 I. C. C. 471, 501 (1939) ; Fifteen Per
Cent Case, 226 I. C. C. 41, 141 (1938); General Commodity Rate Increases, 223 I. C. C.
657, 750 (1937).
9. United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70 (1933).
10. Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 487 (E. D. Va. 1935);
Birmingham Slag Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 486 (N. D. Ala. 1935).
11. This contention was rejected in Geo. Allison & Co. v. Norfolk S. R. R., 218
I. C. C. 197 (1936). A similar result has been reached where the ICC had previously
found assailed rates unreasonable in the past and had awarded reparations to a certain
base rate. The carriers have contended that the Commission thus approved the base
rate. Pine Grove Tanning Co. v. Reading Co., 234 I. C. C. 422 (1939); Indiana State
Chamber of Comm. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 208 I. C. C. 446 (1935).
12. The ICC appears to have looked with favor upon this contention immediately
after the Arizona decision. See St. John's Co-op. Co. v. Cincinnati, S. & M. R. R., 185
I. C. C. 669, 670-1 (1932) ; Ash Grove Lime & Cement Co. v. Chicago & A. R. R., 188
I. C. C. 451, 454 (1932). But it has uniformly rejected the argument in later decisions,
stating that a prior adjudication of no unreasonableness is purely negative in character
and does not constitute quasi-legislative action. William Kelly Milling Co. v. Atchison,
T. &-S. F. Ry., 211 I. C. C. 53 (1935) ; Parkersburg Rig & Reel Co. v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 198 I. C. C. 709 (1934); Standard Pkg. Co. v. Union P. R. R., 190 1. C. C. 433
(1932). In recent decisions the ICC has extended its "negative finding" doctrine to
include the situation where it had previously found assailed rates established by the car-
riers not unreasonable for the future. Morehead Cotton Mills Co. v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry., 231 I. C. C. 437 (1939); Halifax Coal & Wood Co. v. Atlantic & Y. R. R., 219
I. C. C. 594 (1936).
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had its genesis in the opening paragraph of the Aricona opinion in which it
is stated that the "case turns upon the power of the . . . Commission to
award reparations" on "shipments which moved under rates approved or pre-
scribed by it."13 This contention of the carriers based upon the word "ap-
proved" received judicial sanction in two federal decisions 14 but the Com-
mission has refused to follow them.' 5
The effect to be given orders suspending proposed revisions in rates pending
investigation of their legality has likewise been a source of dispute.10 The
carriers have unsuccessfully argued that such suspension orders sanction the
existing rates during the period of suspension and preclude reparation awards
in subsequent proceedings attacking the rates.17 Controversy has also arisen
where the Commission, in a prior proceeding, has directed the carriers to
conform to certain findings but has entered no mandatory order. On the
ground that its "directory" as distinguished from "mandatory" functions' s
are not quasi-legislative in character, the Commission has rejected the con-
13. See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S. 370, 381 (1932)
(Italics supplied).
14. Arizona Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Southern P. Co., 68 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A.
9th, 1934); El Paso & S. V. R. R. v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co., 75 F. (2d) 873
(C. C. A. 9th, 1935). Contra: Pitzer Tfr. Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 10 F. Supp. 436
(D. Md. 1935); cf. Corray v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 2 F. Supp. 829 (E. D. I1. 1933).
In the Arizona Wholesale Grocery case the court held that a prior adjudication of no
unreasonableness constituted a "positive finding of negative fact" which %%as quasi-legis-
lative in character.
15. See William Kelly Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 211 I. C. C. 53, 54-5
(1935). The position taken by the ICC seems clearly correct. When a rate is assailed
as unreasonable before the Commission, the burden is upon the party attacking the rate
to establish that it is unreasonable in fact. Louisville & N. R.. R. v. United States, 238
U. S. 1 (1915). 'Moreover, the Commission must act only upon the evidence presented
in the proceeding. Facts independently known to the ICC will not support an order in
this situation. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & N. R. ., M U. S. 88
(1913); cf. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924). Hence a finding of no un-
reasonableness indicates only the Commission's judgment on the sufficiency of evidence
presented in the particular case.
16. The Commission is authorized to suspend filed tariff schedules either upon com-
plaint or upon its own motion pending investigation. 36 STAT. 552 (1910) as amended,
41 STAT. 486-7 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(7) (1935). For the operation and function of the
Investigation and Suspension Order see UNITED STATES AT'r" Grds Co.,iumE oN AD-
IMINISTRATIVE PRocEDURE, THE INTERSTATE COMMER CE COiM[. (1940) 109 cf seq.
17. Inasmuch as the Investigation and Suspension Order protects the carriers from
the consequences of illegality in the proposed revisions, the ICC apparently feels that
they should not also be protected during the period of suspension from defects in the
existing rates. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Alton R. I., 198 I. C. C. 785 (1934) (carrier
proposed revision suspended); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. New York Central P.. P., 203
I. C. C. 260 (1934) (ICC prescribed revision but suspended new rates prior to effective
date of order); Metal & Thermit Corp. v. Central P.. P. of N. J., 194 I. C. C. 475
(1933) (ICC prescribed revision). The Commission has also stated that vacating a sus-
pension order does not constitute "legislative" approval of the new rates. See Kansas
City Ice Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 215 I. C. C. 616, 619 (1936).
18. Basis for this distinction is found in United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. R.,
282 U. S. 522, 527-8 (1931).
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tention of the carriers that rates established in accordance with its directions
are the substantial equivalent of rates established under a compulsory order. 19
In addition to these situations in which argument has centered around the
effect to be given particular types of prior rate orders, the Commission has
been quick to distinguish the facts in proceedings before it from those pre-
sented in the Arizona case. 20 Application of the Arizona rule has thus been
confined to a limited number of instances involving the same type of prior
rate order and substantially identical fact situations.21
The technical verbal battles2 2 concerning the applicability of the Arizona
case have illustrated the difficulties inherent in determining precisely when
rates attain the commission-made status. The restrictive interpretation of
the Arizona rule adopted by the ICC and the courts is well conceived in terms
of Commission function. The Interstate Commerce Act and its subsequent
amendments established an effective system of rate regulation whereby the
ICC was empowered to fix rates for the future while retaining the power
to balance for errors in the past through awards of reparation. But practical
economic advantages on the side of the carriers - superior organization and
19. Refrigeration Charges on Fruits from the South, 222 I. C. C. 245 (1937) ; A. B.
Cole & Sons v. Missouri P. R. R., 198 I. C. C. 252 (1933); Shelbina Milling Co. v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 198 I. C. C. 241 (1933); Schmidt Lumber Co. v. Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. Ry., 191 I. C. C. 141 (1933).
20. Where two segments of a through rate had been separately prescribed as reason-
able by the Commission in prior proceedings, and the carriers had established a through
rate by charging the sum of the two local rates, the Arizona case has been held not to
preclude reparation awards in a proceeding attacking the through rate as unreasonable.
Atlantic & Y. Ry. v. Carolina Button Corp., 74 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Read
Phosphate Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 194 I. C. C. 73 (1933); cf. Alabama Gro-
cery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 206 I. C. C. 559 (1935). Where a prior order con-
cerned only the establishment of equitable rate relationships and removal of undue preju-
dice, the Arizona case presented no barrier in subsequent proceedings involving the rea-
sonableness of such rates. Jones v. Alton & S. Ry., 6 F. Supp. 807 (E. D. Ill. 1934) ;
see White Eagle Oil Corp. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 200 I. C. C. 793, 795 (1934);
State Highway Comm. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 203 I. C. C. 282, 284-5 (1934);
cf. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 216 I. C. C. 241, 243 (1936).
Failure of the ICC, in its prior order, to prescribe rates between specific points involved
in a later case has likewise proved fatal to the applicability of the Arizona case. Traffic
Bureau of Lynchburg v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 214 I. C. C. 461 (1936); Phillips Lumber
Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 213 I. C. C. 617 (1936) ; see Distributors Pkg. Co. v. Great
N. Ry., 215 I. C. C. 405 (1936). For a similar situation involving intermediate rates
established to prevent violation of the long and short haul clause, see Boston Wool Trade
Ass'n v. Ahnapee & W. Ry., 203 I. C. C. 85 (1934) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 192 I. C. C. 712 (1933); Cole Bros. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 190
I. C. C. 737 (1933).
21. For typical cases in which the Arizona case rule has been applied, see McDonald
Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 238 I. C. C. 252 (1940); Mt. Vernon Bridge Co. v. Bal-
timore & 0. R. R., 235 I. C. C. 365 (1939); Consolidated Cottonseed Operating Co. v.
Arkansas & M. Ry. Bridge & Term. Co., 182 I. C. C. 12 (1932).
22. See especially the opinion in Arizona Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Southern P. Co.,
68 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
[Vol. 50
a more intimate contact with general rate problems2 - were offset by author-
izing the Commission to award reparations to shippers alone. The remedy
of the carriers is a timely application for a change in the rate structure before
damage has occurred. In confining the shipper to the same remedy, especially
where the ICC had prescribed only a maximum rate, the Arizona decision
failed to attach proper significance to the comparative disadvantage of his
position in relation to the carriers. The broad interpretation of the case
urged by the carriers would virtually eliminate the Commission's power to
award reparations and would thus destroy the balance contemplated by the
Act.
Moreover, strong argumnent can be made that efficacious handling of con-
stantly changing fact situations demands an elastic machinery with as few
rigid jurisdictional barriers as possible.2 4 Cases should be heard on the
merits when the Commission, with its expert insight into the complex econ-
omic problems involved, deems such hearings expedient. Reparation awards
should be granted in an essentially empirical system of rate-making when
the Commission, in the flexible exercise of its discretion, considers such
awards necessary to accomplish substantial justice. This does not mean that
the Commission would follow no consistent pattern in handling reparation
cases. It early adopted the practice of following its prior orders except where
there was a change in economic conditions,2 new facts were brought to
its attention,"2 6 or it had acted upon a misapprehension of fact in the prior
proceeding.2 7 But the problems of reparation procedure are problems to be
worked out by the Commission in the light of its experience and should not
be subjected to judicial restraint in the absence of express statutory provision.
Short of legislation, other devices are available by which the effect of the
Arizona decision can and should be further limited. The Commission may
rely more heavily on the "fact situation" clause 28 in the Arizona opinion.
This would permit retroactive rate adjustments by means of reparation awards
23. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 625.
24. See 2 SHAnFmAN, THE INTERSTATE CoMaRnca CoMxMIssIoN; (1931) 367 cf seq.;
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Comnission: An Appraisal (1937) 46 Y.%L. L. J.
915; Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443, 445 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931)
(concurring opinion of Judge Hutcheson).
25. See Ontario Iron Ore Co. v. New York Central & H. R. R. L, 30 1. C. C. 566,
570 (1914) ; Jouannet v. Atlantic C. L. R. L, 23 I. C. C. 392, 393 (1912).
26. See West Virginia Rail Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 48 I. C. C. 600, 603 (1918).
27. See Traugott Schmidt & Sons v. Michigan Central R. R., 23 I. C. C. 634, 6S5
(1912).
28. The Arizona opinion states that where the ICC has declared a maximum
reasonable rate "... it may not at a later time, and upon the same or additional evi-
dence as to the fact situation existing when its previous order was promulgated, by de-
claring its own findings as to reasonableness erroneous . . ." award reparations in a
proceeding attacking the rate. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284
U. S. 370, 390 (1932). This wording would seem to indicate that the Ari.ona decision
was restricted to the situation where the Commission attempts to set aside its prior order
as erroneous. See Robinson Clay Products Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 203 1. C. C.
147 (1935) for an application of this interpretation. But cf. International Agric. Corp.
v. Boston & M. R. R., 222 I. C. C. 397 (1937).
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where either a long-term 29 or short-term change in economic conditions had
occurred since the prior order. More extensive use of rate orders limited in
time would successfully obviate the Arizona case barrier since the burden of
maintaining rates at a reasonable level would fall upon the carrier as soon
as the temporary order expired. 30 A further possibility lies in the power of
the Commission to rescind its prior orders, rendering their effect upon sub-
sequent proceedings nugatory.31 This would allow retroactive adjustment
even where the Commission had acted upon a misapprehension of fact in
the prior proceeding. But the Commission function of harmonizing the econ-
omic and social relationships between shipper, carrier, and public can be
attained most simply by rejecting the Arizona rule, at least where the Com-
mission order has prescribed only maximum, or maximum and minimum,
rates.
3 2
LIMITATION PERIOD FOR PRESENTING OVERPAYMENT ISSUES
BEFORE THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS*
AN efficient method for adjusting disputes over federal income tax liability
is of considerable importance because of the magnitude of the task of admin-
istering tax laws.1 One road to achievement of such a method lies in the
use of informal settlement procedure within the administrative set-up as a
means of avoiding more cumbersome judicial hearings. 2 Successful use of
29. The Commission has developed an equitable policy of denying reparation awards
where a long-term change in conditions has occurred since its prior order making it im-
possible to determine the precise date the rate became unreasonable and where the car-
riers believed they were maintaining rates satisfactory to the ICC. Eastern Livestock
Cases of 1926, 144 I. C. C. 731, 781 (1928) ; Coal Trade Ass'n v. Baltimore & 0. R. R.,
190 I. C. C. 743 (1933); Scott County Milling Co. v. Butler Co. R. R., 194 I. C. C. 763,
786 (1933) ; American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Southern P. Co., 222 I. C. C. 513 (1937).
30. El Paso & S. W. R. R. v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co., 75 F. (2d) 873 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1935); William Kelly Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 211 I. C. C. 53
(1935); American Paving Corp. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 197 I. C. C. 699 (1933).
31. Compare Carolina Shippers' Ass'n v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 198 I. C. C. 347
(1934).
32. The tenor of recent Supreme Court opinions indicates a liberal tendency in per-
mitting administrative agencies to function free of judicial restraint. Federal Communi-
cations Comm. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940); Rochester Tel.
Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939).
* Comm'r v. Dallas' Estate, 110 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
1. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and
Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1393; Prettyman, A
Comment on the Traynor Plan for Revision of Federal Tax Procedure (1939) 27 Gao.
L. J. 1038; Angell, Procedural Reform "in the Judicial Review of Controversies under the
Internal Revenue Statutes-An Answer to a Proposal (1939) 34 ILL. L. Rav. 151.
2. "Two premises are agreed-one, that the income and estate taxes involve an
infinite multitude of legitimately disputable questions of fact and of law; two, that admin-
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this procedure depends largely on whether contested issues are defined at an
early stage.3 The significance of this factor is demonstrated by a consideration
of the problem of whether the statute of limitations bars recovery of over-
payments claimed in delayed amendments to Board of Tax Appeals petitions.4
The problem of limitations arises when a taxpayer, who has filed a timely
petition to the Board contesting a deficiency assertion by the Government,
amends his petition after the limitation period has run in order to claim that
his tax was actually overpaid. This situation is governed by a provision
stating that: ". . . No . . . credit or refund shall be made of any portion
of the tax unless the Board determines as a part of its decision that such
portion was paid within three years before the filing of the claim or the
filing of the petition whichever is earlier."0 The Board of Tax Appeals, with-
out discussion of any problem of effective tax administration, has held that
delayed amendments claiming overpayments are allowed by the limitation
provision itself.7 It pointed out that in the provision permitting recovery
if the tax "was paid within three years before . . . the filing of the petition," s
the word "petition" is unqualified. 9 Since a petition to the Board is primarily
an answer to an assertion of a deficiency' ° and does not of necessity claim an
overpayment,1 the Board reasoned that the timely filing of any petition would
satisfy the limitation provision.' 2
The possibility that this construction of the provision would result in delayed
raising by amendment of overpayment issues was regarded by the Board' 3
as a necessary disadvantage to the tax administrators arising out of the
Board's authority to determine its own rules of procedure. 14 The Board first
istrative solution of these disputes is far preferable to judicial solution." Prettynman,
supra note 1, at 1039.
3. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 1418.
4. See Comm'r v. Dallas' Estate, 110 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
5. See ibid; Comnm'r v. Rieck, 104 F. (2d) 294 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Denholm &
McKay Co., 41 B. T. A. No. 132, April 30, 1940.
6. IxT. Rv. CODE § 322(d) (1939).
7. Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937). This was reversed in Comnm'r v.
Rieck, 104 F. (2d) 294 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
8. I T. REv. CODE § 322(d) (1939).
9. Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937).
10. A prior assertion of deficiency is necessary for the jurisdiction of the Board.
INr. REv. CODE § 272(a) (1) (1939) ; Standard Island Creek Coal Co., 28 B. T. A. 690
(1933); Potts Run Coal Co., 19 B. T. A. 1 (1930). Unless the petition is filed vithin
90 days (60 days prior to the Revenue Act of 1934) the Board has no jurisdiction. IT.
REv. CODE § 272(a) (1) (1939); Poynor v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936);
J. XV. Teasdale & Co., 5 B. T. A. 1244 (1927).
11. See IN-r. REv. CODE §272(a)(1) (1939).
12. Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937); see Denholm & McKay Co., 41 B.
T. A. No. 132, April 30, 1940.
13. Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937).
14. The REVENUE Acr OF 1924, § 907(a), as amended by the REvE_-NuE Acr OF 1928,
§601, provides in part: "The proceedings of the Board and its divisions shall be con-
ducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than rules of evi-
dence) as the Board may prescribe."
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pointed out that, although a petition was necessary for its jurisdiction,1 this
requirement was satisfied without setting forth the grounds of contest,10 and
that the presentation of issues in the petition as well as changes by amend-
ment was controlled by Board rules.17 The Board then argued that a con-
struction requiring timely presentation of grounds of over-payment would
restrict its power to control the presentation of issues.' 8
This technical treatment of the problem by the Board of Tax Appeals
neglected important administrative considerations. The Board apparently
failed to recognize that its jurisdiction to determine overpayment and defi-
ciency issues together combines tax disputes involving distinct administrative
policies regarding the formulation of contested issues.10 A taxpayer seeking
to recover an overpayment in the absence of a deficiency dispute must first
present the grounds of recovery to the Bureau of Internal Revenue in a claim
for refund,20 filed with the Commissioner within the limitation period. 21
Judicial enforcement of the claim in a district court or the Court of Claims,
available after the Commissioner has rejected the claim or delayed acting
upon it,22 is confined to the issues originally presented to the Commissioner. 23
In a deficiency procedure, on the other hand, the Government initiates pro-
ceedings 24 and the taxpayer need not present grounds of contest until he
petitions for a judicial hearing by the Board of Tax Appeals, 2 and he may,
in fact, change these grounds by amendment even during the Board hearing. 20
Once there has been an assertion of deficiency, however, it is necessary to
settle overpayment issues in one proceeding in order to prevent separate
judicial hearings concerning different aspects of the same liability.27 But it
does not necessarily follow that the need for combining overpayment and
deficiency procedure removes the obligation on the taxpayer to present over-
payment issues within the limitation period.
Such a result would in fact hamper the administration of overpayment dis-
putes. The tax adjustment system is so arranged that there is no time con-
suming formal proceeding to investigate facts during the administrative stages,
15. A petition within 90 days after the notice of deficiency is necessary for the Board's
jurisdiction. See note 10 supra. The filing of a petition effects a stay of alternative judi-
cial adjustment. INT. Rav. CODE § 322(c) (1939).
16. In Continental Petroleum Co. v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 10th,
1936) a telegram requesting an extension of the jurisdictional period for filing a petition
was considered a sufficient informal petition to give the Board jurisdiction.
17. See Rules of Practice Before The United States Board of Tax Appeals, Rules
6, 17.
18. Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937).
19. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 1413.
20. INT. RFv. CODE §3772(a)(1) (1939).
21. INT. Rv. CODE §322(b)(1) (1939).
22. INT. R V. CODE §3772(a) (1939).
23. United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U. S. 269 (1931); Lewis A. Cros-
sett Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. CI. 292 (1931).
24. See INT. REV. CODE § 272(a) (1) (1939).
25. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 1400.
26. Rules of Practice before the United States Board of Tax Appeals, Rule 17.
27. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 1402.
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full presentation of facts being delayed until the judicial hearing. "4 Admin-
istrative settlement of tax disputes is therefore hindered by a lack of factual
information,29 but this difficulty is mitigated in overpayment disputes if the
Bureau is aware of the precise issues upon which recovery is sought. This
result is accomplished in the case of refund claim procedure because, by
limiting the judicial hearing to the issues set forth in a timely refund claim,
the taxpayer must present his overpayment issue early in order to protect
himself.30 Thus the Bureau can always conduct an informal examination of
the validity of the taxpayer's claim and may be able to settle it without the
expense of a judicial hearing.
If the Board of Tax Appeals' interpretation of the limitation provision were
followed, the advantages of early formulation of overpayment issues would
be sacrificed in disputes in which the Bureau had asserted a deficiency. The
taxpayer could preserve such issues by filing a timely petition to the Board
which simply contested the grounds of deficiency,"' in view of the Board's
interpretation that any petition giving jurisdiction to hear the case would
toll the limitation provision.3 2 This would mean that the Bureau might be
surprised at any point in the hearing by overpayment issues which, if known
earlier, might have been settled informally and might possibly have enabled
the consummation of a satisfactory settlement of the entire dispute out of court.
In Commissioner v. Dallas' Estate,33 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit appreciated the incongruity of this result and avoided it by
requiring overpayment issues before the Board to be set forth within the
28. See Prettyman, supra note 1.
29. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 1400.
30. See Lewis A. Crossett Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. CI. 292 (1931).
31. See Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937). The Board could, of course,
restrict the raising of issues in amendments by its rules [see note 14 supra], but at
present it permits them in its discretion. Rules of Practice Before the United States
Board of Tax Appeals, Rule 17.
32. Edward E. Rieck, 35 B. T. A. 1178 (1937). Even if the Board's interpre-
tation were followed, the Commissioner might prevent delayed raising of overpayment
issues if the tax had been paid at the date the return wvas filed. Since the limitation on
assessments is three years from the date of filing the return, [I.T. Rsv. CoDE § 275(a)
(1939)], and this is suspended by the mailing of a formal letter of deficiency until 60
days after the final determination of the Board, [I.T. REv. CoDs § 277 (1939)), the Com-
missioner could safely delay the deficiency letter until the last day of the three year
period. This would make it impossible for the taxpayer to file a timely petition because
it must be filed within three years of the date the tax was paid to permit recovery, I.T.
REv. CODE § 322(d) (1939). The taxpayer could not avoid this method of preventing
delayed raising of overpayment issues by filing a timely refund claim, because the Board
would be restricted to the issues set forth in the claim, [Lewis A. Crossett Co. v. United
States, 72 Ct Cl. 292 (1931)], and the claim could not be amended if it had been re-
jected by the Commissioner, [Solomon v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937)] or if amendable the amendments would be restricted to the issues raised in the
original claim. United States v. Andrews, 302 U. S. 517 (1932). Such a method of pro-
tecting the Government would, of course, cause useless delay.
33. Comm'r v. Dallas' Estate, 110 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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limitation period. It then applied the rule of refund claim cases84 that "a
timely claim of refund asking repayment of tax on a specific ground may not
be amended after time for filing claim so as to set forth a new and unrelated
ground of refund." 35 By this rule the Bureau is given the opportunity to
negotiate an administrative settlement before the case is heard.
In view of the increased burden currently imposed on the Bureau, 0 there
is an imperative need to keep tax administration operating smoothly. A
complete overhauling of the process is probably necessary to guarantee a truly
efficient adjustment of tax disputes.3 7 Short of that, the Bureau must rely
on its present informal procedure to keep the settlement process from bogging
down because too many cases are forced to the stage of judicial hearings.
The principal case deals, of course, with a minor segment of the range of tax
disputes, but the court's recognition of the difficulties of administration is a
praiseworthy judicial effort to protect the administrative arm as much as
possible within the present statutory framework.
34. United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528 (1937); United States v. An-
drews, 302 U. S. 517 (1937).
35. Comm'r v. Dallas' Estate, 110 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
36. The Revenue Act of 1940, §7(a), requires returns in an increased number of
instances.
37. See Traynor, loc. cit. supra note 1.
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